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In response to current economic downturn coupled with intense global competition, concept of 
supply chain collaboration has emerged as a possible solution for firms aiming to gain 
competitive advantage through cost reduction, increased asset utilization and improving service 
levels.   
In this research, we have analytically examined and identified the stages involved in facilitating 
supply chain collaboration between multiple retailers and/or suppliers in a supply chain network. 
The study considers three types of collaboration strategies and incorporates a combination of 
different techniques such as cluster analysis, analytical network process (ANP) and game theory 
that can help potential partners to plan and implement collaboration initiatives in the supply 
chains. The solution approach along with illustrative example involving a retailer and a supplier 
is presented which can serve as a guideline for potential firms contemplating about entering into 
collaboration. In order to help prospective partners make the decision regarding which type of 
collaboration will be beneficial for them, a collaboration decision making model is built using 
C++ language. The collaboration decision making model incorporates concept of Nash 
equilibrium to ensure each partner is making the best decision while taking into consideration the 
decisions of others. Pre-qualification screening of potential suppliers and/or retailers for possible 
collaboration is carried out by utilizing methods such as cluster analysis and analytical network 
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process (ANP) while final partner selection is made through application of game theory. Finally, 
profit allocation mechanism based on Shapley method is presented which ensures profit is 
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Supply Chain Collaboration, as defined by Simatupang & Sridharan (2002), is an interaction 
between “two or more chain members working together to create a competitive advantage 
through sharing information, making joint decisions, and sharing benefits which result from 
greater profitability of satisfying end customer needs than acting alone.” Current economic 
downturn, intense global competition and fast changing customer demands, have made it 
difficult for organizations to stay competitive in the current market place. Recession scarred 
customers are constantly looking for better quality and innovative products at a relatively low 
price. In the nutshell, organizations which are capable of selling products or services which 
satisfy the above mentioned specifications will be able to dominate the market. 
In response to this challenge, the concept of supply chain collaboration has emerged as a new 
approach to attaining competitive advantage through cost reduction, increased asset utilization, 
reduced inventories, and shared business risk that arises as a result from the coordination of 
actual customer demand with supplier production plans (Lewis, 1990; Parker, 2000; Horvarth, 
2001; Anderson & Lee, 1999; Tidd et al., 2002). Effective supply chain collaboration can help 
organizations reduce excess inventory, shorten lead times and increase sales and customer 
service levels (Anderson & Lee, 1999). Furthermore, supply chain collaboration has allowed 
organizations to enhance flexibility and capabilities by fostering relationships that increase skills 
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and knowledge, facilitate easier product development, offer access to new technologies and 
reduce time to market (Lewis, 1990; Parker, 2000, Holton, 2001; Tidd et al., 2002). 
While supply chain collaboration amongst independent firms can often provide them with 
competitive advantage, however, lack of awareness regarding the presence of barriers of 
collaboration might impede the benefits of collaboration (Ramesh et al., 2010). A number of 
factors such as the level of trust between collaborating partners (Delbufalo, 2012), willingness to 
share information (Barratt, 2004), mistrust regarding the fairness of benefit, costs and risk 
sharing (Cruijssen, 2012; Rossi, 2012) and availability of adequate measurement systems to 
support the efficiency and flexibility requirements of the supply chain (Reddy, 2001a; 
Karahannas & Jones, 1999) can influence the level of benefits that can be realized as a result of 
collaboration.  
One important factor found to be critical in ensuring successful collaboration between partners is 
trust (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Trust exists when partners have complete faith over each other’s 
reliability and capabilities (Heikkila, 2002). The need for trust to exist between partners in 
collaboration has been recognized as a vital aspect of buyer- supplier relationships (Anderson & 
Narus, 1990). According to Dyer (1996), various research studies have shown that successful 
partnerships results when partners demonstrate a willingness to engage in long-term orientation 
or commitment.  
According to Sheu & Chwen (2006), information sharing is seen as a key ingredient for ensuring 
successful collaboration. Several studies (Bowersox et al., 2000; Cannon & Perreault, 1999) have 




Adequate information technology (IT) capabilities and measurement systems can also be an 
important factor for collaborative partnerships (Sabath et al., 2001). Sriram & Banerjee (1994) 
are of the view that electronic data change (EDI) possibly can develop closer partnership 
between collaborative partners. Bowersox & Daugherty (1995) emphasize the importance of 
accuracy and timeliness as important factors for successful collaboration. High interdependence 
is another factor that motivates the partners’ readiness to negotiate functional transfer, share key 
information and involve in joint operational planning (Handfield, 1993; Heikkila, 2002). 
Keeping all these implementation concerns in view, this research will be looking at specific 
solutions which will not only be a complete guide for facilitating & implementing collaboration 
amongst the prospective partners but will also ensure that it remains effective for a long term.   
 
1.2. Problem definition 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework and solution approach for facilitating 
collaboration amongst multiple retailers and/or suppliers for achieving more effective and 
economical supply chain. In order to achieve this aim, a number of research issues will be 
addressed in this thesis as shown below: 
1. Identifying pre-qualification criteria for potential suppliers and/or retailers for 
possible collaboration. 
2. Determining win-win collaboration situation for multiple retailers and/or suppliers 
under different scenarios.  
3. Collaboration model development & simulation of different collaborative strategies. 





The first research problem covers identification of pre-qualification criteria of potential suppliers 
and/or retailers for possible collaboration. Initially, cluster analysis is performed for grouping 
retailers and/or suppliers into clusters of interest. This significantly reduces the number of 
retailers and/or suppliers by grouping only those ones which share similar characteristics such as 
location or industry type. The next step involves application of Analytic Network Process (ANP) 
technique for solving multi-criteria collaboration partner selection problem by taking into 
account the interdependencies between different criteria.  
The second research problem applies game theory concept for analyzing the likely behavior of 
the retailers and/or suppliers under different collaboration scenarios. Three possible modes i.e. 
full collaboration, partial collaboration, or no collaboration are discussed. Payoff functions for 
each partner at different modes are developed and then Nash equilibrium analysis is carried out 
to determine the win-win situation for each of the partners involved in the game by taking into 
consideration the decisions of all the players. 
In the third research problem, a collaboration model is developed by incorporating the concept 
of Nash equilibrium. The model is built using C++ language. The model takes the following 
costs as inputs: 
    = system implementation and integration cost 
    = operational cost 
    = partnership instability cost  
   = switching cost 




These costs can differ under various modes i.e. full collaboration, partial collaboration and no 
collaboration. The model actually sums up and compares these costs for each partner under 
different collaboration modes and then suggests the best course of action for each partner. The 
main aim of the model is to depict the likely behavior of the players under different scenarios. 
For instance, the players would always go for a particular type of collaboration where there are 
lowest costs involved i.e. high payoff functions.  
In the fourth research problem, profit allocation mechanism amongst retailers and/or suppliers is 
developed through utilization of cooperative game theory to ensure equal profit and risk 
allocation amongst the partners.   
 
1.3 Research scope and limitations 
The scope of the thesis is to identify and research all the necessary stages involved in managing 
the lifecycle of a supply chain collaboration process from its conception through planning and 
implementation, to successful execution and disposal. Specifically, the scope of the thesis is to 
provide comprehensive guidelines and solution approach for facilitating collaboration amongst 
multiple retailers and/or suppliers for achieving economic supply chain. A solution approach is 
provided which covers all the aspects involved in the lifecycle of a typical supply chain 
collaboration process.  
The study has some limitations. A possible limitation of this study is that it provides framework 
and solution approach for facilitating collaboration from only retailer and supplier industry’s 
point of view. Efforts were made to contact some of the world’s leading retailers and suppliers, 
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currently collaborating with each other, to ascertain their initial approach towards going into 
collaboration but they were unwilling to share the information. However, persistent effort by the 
author allowed him to access some useful information from Concordia University’s library 
resources which helped him to envisage the likely approach of a typical retailer or a supplier 
before going in collaboration. 
This study considers only three types of collaboration possibilities which can exist between 
multiple retailers and/or suppliers. These include full collaboration, partial collaboration and no 
collaboration. Cluster analysis is performed by keeping into account only three factors i.e. 
location, industry type, market capitalization.  The collaboration model takes only total switching 
costs into account before suggesting the best course of action. The input costs used for the 
collaboration model are fictional numbers and do not represent real life data. 
 
1.4. Thesis outline 
 
The thesis comprises of five chapters. Chapter 1 covers the background, purpose and the 
structure of the thesis. In Chapter 2, a literature review on collaboration planning in supply chain 
is presented along with driving forces, barriers and effects. Chapter 3 provides solution approach 
for facilitating collaboration amongst multiple retailers and/or suppliers for achieving more 
effective and economical supply chain. In Chapter 4, numerical application of solution approach 
is presented. Finally, in chapter 5, conclusions along with future works and contributions of the 







Literature Review  
  
The literature review in this thesis can be divided into four main parts; the first part deals with 
the term “Supply Chain Collaboration”. It concisely provides recent history of the supply chain 
collaboration and briefly discusses the motivation, types, models and the outcomes of the supply 
chain collaboration. The second part consists of the driving forces, barriers and the enablers of 
supply chain collaboration. The main reasons for studying the literature in this part are to identify 
the bottlenecks involved in the process of collaboration and to develop a solution approach 
which keeps these drawbacks into consideration. In the third part, the process of “supply chain 
collaboration” is explained. This part discusses all the steps involved in supply chain 
collaboration process from its conception to planning and implementation. The main aim of this 
section is to provide the foundation for the stakeholder collaboration modeling process and 
hypothesis assessed in this thesis. The fourth part will summarize the literature review and will 
identify the current gaps related to the process of supply chain collaboration.  
 
2.1 Collaboration in supply chain defined 
Cao & Zhang (2010) define supply chain collaboration as “a partnership process where two or 
more autonomous firms work closely to plan and execute supply chain operations towards 
common goals and mutual benefits”. Horvath & Kumar (2006) define collaboration as an 
interaction between “two or more chain members that focus on joint planning, resource 
coordination, and process integration between buyers, suppliers, and other partners in a supply 
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chain. Owing to today’s economic downturn coupled with rapidly changing customer needs and 
technologies, there has been an increased emphasis on supply chain collaboration.  
Collaborative supply chain management moves beyond the concept of mere transactions 
exchanges and entails tactical joint decision making mechanism among the partners in the areas 
of collaborative planning, forecasting, distribution and product design (Kumar, 2001). 
 
2.1.1 The motivation for supply chain collaboration 
The motivation for organizations to pursue supply chain collaboration comes from the fact that 
collaboration in general can help firms to share risks, access complementary resources reduce 
inventories and transaction costs and enhance profit performance and competitive advantage 
over time (Mentzer et al., 2000). 
According to research undertaken on collaborative practices by team from Neeley School of 
Business at Texas Christian University, successful collaboration encourages participants not only 
to share information openly and freely but also to communicate in an honest truthful way, which 
in turn, improves the quality of relationship between collaboration partners.  
Under current business climate, it is difficult for firms to do business on their own and not to 
enter into collaboration. As a consequence of economic downturn coupled with increased 
globalization, businesses have become more specialized and time to market has become one of 
the most critical aspects of competitiveness in today’s volatile business environment. Since 
collaboration provides firms with an opportunity to enter into a partnership where they would be 
able to exploit each other’s competencies and combine them in order to fulfill customer 
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requirements quickly, this has resulted in more and more companies to enter into collaboration 
so that competitive advantage over the rivals can be gained. 
According to Sandberg (2005), true essence of supply chain management is that firms in a supply 
chain should work together to establish collaborative atmosphere where mutual trust, sharing of 
risks, and rewards and extensive information sharing should counteract sub optimizations in the 
supply chain. In other words, effective supply chain requires firms to constitute a kind of 
relationship where each one in the chain agrees on standardized solutions and commits to 
mutually agreed goals and objectives. It becomes imperative for every firm to focus on the chain 
optimization instead of individual gains.  
  
2.1.2 Outcomes of supply chain collaboration  
Collaboration has been considered to be an influential factor behind effective supply chain 
management (Ellram et al., 1990). Collaborative relationships can help firms to share risks and 
exploit each other’s complementary resources (Park et al., 2004). The outcomes of successful 
collaboration include cost reductions, increased revenues, and enhanced operational flexibility to 
manage with high demand uncertainties (Lee et al., 1997). Supply chain collaboration initiatives 
concentrate on lowering uncertainty across the supply chain, which in turn, lessen bullwhip 
effect and results in reduced inventory costs and faster time to market (Lee et al., 1997).  
Collaborative partnerships also result in increased economies of scale and risk (Kumar & 
Dissel,1996). Effective supply chain collaboration can help firms to eliminate excess inventories, 




According to McLaren et al. (2002), several surveys and studies have indicated that projected 
benefits of supply chain collaboration fall into two main categories namely cost reduction and 
increased responsiveness. Cost reduction category includes benefits such as reduced inventory 
levels, product costs and process costs that originate as a result of better coordination of actual 
customer demand with supplier production plans. Increased responsiveness category includes 
advantages such as faster product to market cycle times, enhanced service levels, and a better 
understanding of customer needs across the entire supply chain owing to market intelligence and 
demand visibility (Mentzer et al., 2000). 
 
2.2 Forms of collaboration 
According to Barrat (2004), there are different forms of potential supply chain collaborations 
which can be divided into two main categories, vertical and horizontal collaboration. 
Furthermore, Langley et al. (2008) expresses third form of collaboration called “Full 
Collaboration”, where it syndicates the capabilities of both the vertical and horizontal 
collaboration. Brief description of the above mentioned forms of collaboration are as follows: 
 
2.2.1 Vertical collaboration 
Vertical collaboration usually takes place between buyers and sellers in a supply chain (Langley 
et al., 2008). In vertical collaboration, two or more firms such as manufacturer, retailers, 
distributors and parts and materials suppliers enter into an agreement to share their resources, 
responsibilities, and performance information to provide services to relatively similar end 
customers (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). Vertical collaboration results in better physical and 
information flows, improved inventory management control and enhanced transportation systems 
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(Caputo & Mininno, 1996). Some examples of vertical collaboration include vendor managed 
inventory (VMI), and collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) (Blecker et 
al., 2010). 
 
2.2.2 Horizontal collaboration  
Horizontal collaboration refers to a situation where two or more unrelated or rival firms engaged 
in producing similar products or different parts of one product, decides to  engage in a in a 
cooperative relationship so that resources such as warehouse space and manufacturing capacity 
can be shared (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). According to Langley et al. (2008), horizontal 
collaboration can help participating members to identify and eliminate the hidden costs in the 
supply chain which everyone pays for through facilitation of joint product design, 
manufacturing, sourcing and logistics. Horizontal collaboration can help firms to reduce logistics 
and administration costs and to improve procurement terms owing to group purchasing power 
(Soosay et al., 2008). Horizontal collaboration also helps to overcome financial barriers to trade 
(Manning and Baines, 2004). An example of horizontal collaboration is “Group Purchasing” in 
which competitors cooperate with each other to buy goods so that volume discounts can be 
gained from the common seller (Ozener, 2011). 
 
2.2.3 Full collaboration 
Full collaboration is basically the combination of both vertical and horizontal collaboration so 
that more flexibility can be gained (Langley et al., 2008). According to Mangan et al. (2008), 
combination of horizontal and vertical collaboration can help in reduction of inventory carrying 
costs, unproductive waiting time, overall transport costs and can enhance lead time operation 
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through incorporation of collaborative methods such as joint planning and technology sharing. 
Examples of full collaboration includes Nistevo, Lean Logistics, and Transport Dynamics which 
tries to coordinate shippers and carriers of multiple-businesses in an effective transportation 
network ( Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). 
The three forms of collaboration as defined by Barrat (2004) and Langley et al. (2008) can be 






Supplier # 1 Supplier # 2
Manufacturer # 1 Manufacturer # 2
Distributor # 1 Distributor # 2
Retailer # 1 Retailer # 2
Supplier # 1 Supplier # 2
Manufacturer # 1 Manufacturer # 2
Distributor # 1 Distributor # 2











2.3 Types of collaboration 
There are various types of supply chain collaboration. Some of the most common ones include 
strategic alliances, joint ventures and cooperative arrangements (Soosay et al., 2008). Brief 
descriptions are as follows: 
 
2.3.1 Strategic alliances 
Strategic alliances are generally considered as a particular form of inter-firm relationships that 
are supposed to be of long term and in which two or more partners share resources, costs, 
knowledge, risks and capabilities with the aim of improving the competitive position of each 
partner (Spekman & Sawhney, 1990). According to Lorange & Roos (1991), strategic alliances 
can help partners to quickly get access to new technologies, enter new markets, evade strict 
governmental controls and to promptly acquire knowledge from industry’s leaders. Strategic 
alliance provides each partner with an opportunity to focus on their core competencies which 
gives them competitive advantage over their rivals.  
 
2.3.2 Joint ventures 
Join ventures is basically a formal agreement between two or more firms in order to create new 
products and services, enter new and foreign markets, or possibly both (Beamish, 2008). Joint 
ventures help to create new market opportunities in which the firm, searching for a new market 
usually provides goods or services, marketing strategies and financial capability whereas local 
party provides market knowledge, labour and access to public and private sector networks 
(Collins & Doorley, 1991). According to Hennart (1988), firms enter into this type of agreement 
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to facilitate collaboration at a single point in the supply chain so that economies of scale in 
manufacturing or distribution can be realized.  
 
2.3.3 Cooperative arrangements 
Owing to rapidly changing technologies and increased globalization, many organizations are 
forced to look for cooperative arrangements with other firms (Ring & Ven, 1992). According to 
Kumar (1996), the main purpose of cooperative efforts is to move from purely contractual 
arrangements to somewhat more trusting relationships with parties. This move urges the parties 
such as manufacturers and suppliers to start relying on each other to be supportive and build trust 
by taking into consideration a long term view of the relationships and dealing productively with 
the potential conflicts that might arise (Hines, 1995).  
 
2.4 The supply chain collaborative planning 
Few studies have identified the important steps involved in achieving supply chain collaboration 
(Lummus et al., 1998; Corbett et al., 1999; Boddy et al., 2000). These steps raise some vital 
points regarding the role of planning in supply chain collaboration (Cassivi, 2006). According to 
VICS association, a more comprehensive approach known as collaborative planning, forecasting 
and replenishment (CPFR), presents a chronological method that identifies key actions to be 
carried during the formulation of collaboration initiatives.  
CPFR is basically an initiative of the voluntary inter-industry commerce standards association 
(VICS), which outlines the operational actions that facilitate partners to plan collaboration 
initiatives in the supply chains (VICS, 1998). CPFR has its roots in a series of tactics 
implemented in the 1980’s and 1990’s to optimize activities related to inventory and 
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replenishment (Cassivi, 2006). These methods were aimed for bringing supply chain partners 
close to each other but none of them actually laid stress of information sharing between partners 
(Boddy et al., 2000). Collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) incorporates 
the operational benefits of all these methods and combines collaborative mechanisms to enable 
information sharing exchange in a multi-layered supply chain (Boddy et al., 2000). As can be 
seen in the figure 2 below, the four collaborative activities are divided into 8 tasks - two for each 
collaborative activity (Cassivi, 2006). 
Collaborative activities Collaboration tasks 
Strategy and Planning 
1.      Collaboration Arrangement 
2.      Joint Business Plan 
Demand and Supply Chain Management 
3.      Sales Forecasting 
4.      Order Planning/Forecasting 
Execution 
5.      Order Generation 
6.      Order Fulfillment 
Analysis 
7.      Exception Management 
8.      Performance Assessment 
Figure 2: Collaborative Planning Process (Source: Cassivi, 2006) 
 
 
Strategy and planning 
The first stage of strategy and planning entails two critical steps: collaboration arrangement and 
joint business plan. The subsequent stage involves two forecast related steps: Sales forecasting 
and order planning/forecasting. The next stages: execution and analysis comprises two steps each 
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i.e. order generation and order fulfilment for execution stage and exception management and 
performance assessment for analysis stage. In CPFR process, planning stage is crucial since this 
is the stage where partners form collaboration initiatives and terms. While planning supply chain 
relationships, first two steps in CPFR approach are significant. During collaboration 
arrangement, all partners’ needs and goals are simplified. Particpating firms devise and consent 
on a collaborative program which ascertains vital supply chain metrics. This arrangement 
ensures adequate commitment  to collaboration by all supply chain partners and brings together 
all parties concerned around the goals (Cassivi, 2006). The second step i.e. joint business plan 
allows partners to penetrate collaboration process through the product/service information to be 
exchanged. This requires the swap of  strategies along with the business plans between partners 
with the aim of collaborating on the formation of a joint business plan. Organisations mostly 
communicate about continuing business tactics and then incorporate the features of the joint 
business plan into their planning systems (Cassivi, 2006).   
 
Demand and supply management 
In the demand and supply change management stage, sales forecasting task involves forecasting 
the consumer demand which is then used to develop an order planning/ forecasting schedule in 
which inventory lead times, logistics restrictions and other important factors influencing the 





In execution stage, order generation is used to convert forecasts to exact demand so that order 
fulfillment task can be initiated which is actually the process of producing, dispatching and 
keeping the goods (Cassivi, 2006).  
 
Analysis 
Lastly, in the analysis stage, two tasks, i.e. exception management and performance assessment 
are used to continuously observe any abrupt variations in quality and to offer the important 
metrics to assess the success of the business objectives and to examine the industry trends which 
can help in changing the strategy more rapidly if required (Cassivi, 2006). 
The advantages of CPFR include improved customer service (Cassivi, 2006), cost reduction by 
removing the middle man amongst others (Pallab, 2012), early involvement of partners (Cassivi, 
2006), more sales (Pallab, 2012) and benefits from a pull process (Cassivi, 2006). 
 
2.5 Supply chain collaboration model 
Since the essence of collaboration is to optimize profitability, the chain members are required to 
plan, implement and control vital decisions at the interface boundaries which are related to 
specifying and providing products/services to end customer that result in mutual advantage 
(Simatupang & Sridharan, 2004). The collaborative supply chain presumes that the chain 
members synchronize decision making across supply chain, share information to make efficient 
decisions that helps enhance performance and incorporate incentive tactics for specifying 
decision bonus and penalty mechanisms (Lee et al., 1997; Simatupang & Sridharan 2002). As a 
result of that, the model of supply chain collaboration can be classified by three enabling 
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elements of collaborative practice which includes information sharing, decision synchronization 
and incentive alignment (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2004). These three elements of collaborative 
practice are supposed to assist the chain members in cross organizational cooperation that 
facilitates them to achieve enhanced overall performance.  
Collaborative Performance System
Shared Supply Chain Processes: 


















































Figure 3: A Conceptual Model for Supply Chain Collaboration  
(Source: Simatupang and Sridharan, 2004) 
 
As can be seen in figure 3, the three elements of supply chain collaboration are linked directly to 
supply chain performance (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2004). The details of the three elements of 
supply chain collaboration are as follows: 
 
2.5.1 Information sharing 
Information sharing is the initial point in any supply chain collaboration. The purpose of 
information sharing is to obtain and circulate timely and useful information to allow decision 
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makers to plan and manage supply chain operations (Cassivi, 2006). Effective information 
sharing delivers a shared basis for joint actions by different functions across interdependent firms 
(Whipple et al., 2002). Some examples of shared data include points of sale (POS) data, 
inventory levels, demand forecasts, inventory costs and delivery schedules. Information sharing 
also helps in facilitating clarity about demand, common performance and fulfillment process 
(Pallab, 2012). Fisher (1997) is of the opinion that supply chain collaboration results in cohesive 
market focus, better coordination of demand fulfillment and sales and minimum risks related 
with demand uncertainty. Therefore, information sharing seems to allow the chain members to 
perform better (Lee et al., 1997; Whipple et al., 2002). 
 
2.5.2 Decision synchronization 
Decision synchronization basically corresponds to joint decision making in the context of 
planning and operation (Cassivi, 2006). These joint decisions are used to drive logistics 
processes within an individual chain member firm (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2004). Planning 
part combines decisions regarding long term planning and measures such as customer service 
levels, selecting target markets, product range, forecasting and promotion. The operational part 
deals with integrating order generation and delivery process which can be in the forms of 
replenishment of the products to the shops and delivery schedule (Simatupang & Sridharan, 
2004). Decision synchronization brings chain members together and instills a feeling of 
belongingness in which all decisions are geared towards a mutual goal of better serving the end 
customers (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2004). According to Ramdas & Spekman (2000), it 
decreases the gap between delivery requirements and actual delivery, which in turn, enhances 
customers’ views on fulfillment performance. As a consequence, customers get pleased as they 
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realize that products are well conformed to their requirements at the right time and at the right 
price. Therefore, decision synchronization leads to a reputation of consistent product availability 
and on time delivery (Bowersox et al., 2000).   
 
2.5.3 Incentive alignment  
Incentive alignment corresponds to the point to which chain members share risks, costs, and 
benefits. Administration and technology related costs need to be shared equally (Simatupang & 
Sridharan, 2004). Furthermore, chain members oblige to the collaborative endeavors especially 
when they conceptualize relevant benefits that can be achieved as a result of collaboration 
(Kaplan & Narayanan, 2001). According to Corbett et al. (1999), advantages of collaboration 
include both performance enhancement such as reduced inventory costs and business gains such 
as increase in sales. Incentive alignment also entails risk sharing between chain members in 
controlling demand, supply and price. Establishing and implementing incentives such as 
remunerating receptiveness and sharing the costs of reductions, encourage the chain members to 
take decisions that are in line with the attainment of profitable supply chain (Simatupang & 
Sridharan, 2004). 
 
2.6 Driving forces, barriers and enablers of supply chain collaboration 
In order to facilitate an effective implementation of collaboration, the organizations must be 
completely aware of the barriers, driving forces and enablers of supply chain collaboration.  
 
2.6.1 Driving Forces for supply chain collaboration 
  
Collaboration between firms is generally perceived to increase efficiency and reduce costs 
(Gadman, 2004).  According to Lynch (2001) (as cited in Kaveh & Samani, 2009), it is important 
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to realize that collaborative supply chain is driven as a result of a change in corporate vision that 
considers competition and suppliers as potential collaborative partners in supply chain. Dynamic 
firms tend to exploit these relationships to achieve efficiencies through shared operations 
(Gadman, 2004). Most company’s perception about collaboration is that it can help them reduce 
costs, enhance supply chain efficiency and help trading partners become more adaptable in 
response to customers’ demand fluctuations (Kaveh & Samani, 2009). Therefore the two very 
important reasons why companies enter into collaboration are cost reductions and the need to 
cater to rapidly changing demands of customers (Fawcett & Magnun, 2011). Third party service 
providers and retailers lay emphasis on customer needs whilst finished goods assemblers and 
suppliers focus more on supply chain efficiencies. Firms that focus only on cost reduction are 
likely to encounter more resistance to change and greater mistrust from managers and employees 
(Fawcett & Magnun, 2011).  
 
2.6.2 Reasons for entering into collaboration 
In addition to these forces, the reasons for firms entering into collaboration with each other may 
vary from company to company depending mainly on the company’s position in the supply 
chain. Emmett et al. (2006) categorized the reasons why firms decide to enter into collaborative 








Table 1: Top reasons for collaboration - Buyer's perspective  
(Source: Emmet and Crocker, 2006) 
Main reason why companies enter collaborative 
relationships (buyer's perspective) 
Type of 
driver 
Price of delivery item Cost 
Secure reliable sources Cost & Value 
Influencing supplier's quality Value 
Improve delivery schedules Value 
Access to supplier's new technology Value 
Reduce internal procurement procedures and costs Cost & Value 
Support JIT initiatives Cost & Value 
Reduce administration procedures and costs (for example, 
ordering and invoicing) 
Cost & Value 
 
 
Table 2: Top reasons for collaboration - Supplier's perspective  
(Source: Emmet and Crocker, 2006) 
Main reason why companies enter collaborative 
relationships (supplier's perspective) 
Type of 
driver 
Secure buyer for product Cost & Value 
Influence customer's quality Value 
Support customer's JIT initiatives Value 
Support forecasts of requirements Cost & Value 
Reduce ongoing administration Cost & Value 
Reduce internal sales procedures and costs Cost & Value 
Price improvement Cost 





2.6.3 Barriers for supply chain collaboration 
According to Fawcett & Magnun (2001), there are two other main categories of collaboration 
barriers – technology and human related. 
2.6.3.1 Technology barriers 
With regards to technology barriers, there is a need for a “collaborative technology 
infrastructure” since the concept of supply chain collaboration is dependent on extensive 
information sharing amongst the partners (Horvath, 2001). Earlier, electronic data interchange 
(EDI) solutions were perceived to be harder for small firms to collaborate effectively but recent 
technology advancements in internet based alternatives to EDI involving lower costs has 
provided small firms access to the technology and opportunities which allows them to engage 
easily in more extensive and advanced forms of collaboration (Sandberg, 2005). In spite of this, 
some technology related barriers may still persist because the issue of successful implementation 
of the technology still remains a matter of concern. Buying the technology solution at a low price 
doesn’t imply that it will be successfully executed and used (Sandberg, 2005). Hoffman & Mehra 
(2000) revealed in their study regarding implementation of efficient consumer response (ECR) 
amongst firms in the grocery industry “If there is one element that can cause the breakdown of 
any “best designed” supply channel, it is the technology factor. In this stage, a clear 
understanding of the technology needs of all partners must be assessed followed by information 
flow planning” (Sandberg, 2005). Another important barrier that should be considered after the 
successful adoption of technology solution is confidentiality. Horvath (2001) emphasizes that the 
security concern of the new technology solution is significant in collaborative relationships. 
Since collaboration involves extensive information sharing amongst partners, it is imperative that 
information being shared is only accessible to authorized people who are unlikely to transmit this 
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information to competitors. In case of leakage of information to competitors, this could prove to 
be fatal for company’s goal of achieving competitive advantage over its rivals. Secondly, firms 
should also consider installing proper security measures to make sure that data is transmitted 
safely and in order to avert information breaches.  
 
2.6.3.2 Human related barriers 
Human nature is also one of the major barriers of supply chain collaboration. Most people are 
averse to change, and the true essence of supply chain collaboration requires a change in mindset 
and practice (Fawcett & Magnun, 2011). This can lead to confusion and even resistance from 
company’s managers which can dampen the chances of collaboration. It is important for 
company’s management to clearly articulate a clear supply chain collaboration vision so that 
people can be assured that it won’t affect them in anyway and will in fact be beneficial for them 
in the long term (Fawcett & Magnun, 2011). Trust is another common human related barrier to 
collaboration. Moore (2003) is of the view that two types of trust are required for collaboration 
to happen; trust between partners and trust between humans and the technology.  Barratt & 
Oliveira (2001) and Cooke (2003) came up with the following main collaboration barriers (as 
cited in Janvier & Didier, 2011): inadequate replenishment system in response to demand 
fluctuations; inefficient forecast planning using visibility of point of sales (POS) customer 
demand; ineffectiveness to control the forecast review processes; absence of trust and 
information sharing between partners; non presence of an integrated decision support system to 
supply customer, consumer and market data; inadequate and inconsistent performance measures 
and non-aligned and incompatible objectives. Each of these individual barriers poses a challenge 




Apart from these, the other most common barriers contributing to failed collaboration as 
identified by Kaveh & Samani (2009) are listed in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Common barriers to collaboration (Source: Kaveh & Samani, 2009) 
Barriers contributing to failed collaboration Type of driver 
- Failure to reach an understanding1 
Human Related 
- Lack of shared goals 
- Different opinion concerning responsibility area 
- Lack of understanding of owns company’s functions 
- Having realistic expectation 
 
Lack of top management support Human Related 
Lack of trust Human Related 









Transactional methods of partnering
3
 Human Related 
Opportunism and self-interest (may lead to betray)
4
 Human Related 
Failure to measure collaborative approach advantages
5
 Human Related 
Focus on negative implication
6
 Human Related 
Focus and concentrate on short term results
7
 Human Related 
Technical difficulties (such as IT problems) Human Related 
Startup factors such as initial costs
8
 Human Related 
Time Investment
9
   
                                                          
1
 Ackerman (1996); Harrison et al. (2008); Mentzer et al. (2000);   
2
 Emmett (2006); Harrison et al. (2008)  
3
 Czaplewski et al. (2002); Emmett (2006); Mentzer et al. (2000); Harrison et al. (2008); Min et al. (2005)  
4
 Mentzer  et al. (2000); Harrison et al. (2008)  
5
 Czaplewski et al. (2002);  
6
 Harrison et al. (2008)  
7
 Emmett (2006)  
8
 House  et al. (2001)  
9




2.6.4 Key enablers 
In order to overcome the barriers contributing to unsuccessful collaboration, possible “enabling 
strategies” should be worked out which can facilitate effective implementation of supply chain 
collaboration. According to Mentzer et al. (2000), the key enablers for ensuring successful 
collaboration includes: trust, openness, leadership, longevity of the relationship and benefit 
sharing. In addition to these, some other enablers as suggested by Kaveh & Samani (2009) that 
might be implanted in order to achieve the desired results are shown in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Key enablers of supply chain collaboration (Source: Kaveh & Samani, 2009) 
Key Enablers 
Two way information sharing and data transparency (communication) 




Financial and non-financial investments including: 
- time 
- money 
- training, and 
- right and up-dates technology 




Definition and understanding of
12
 
- Scope, goals and objectives of operation 
- Roles 
- Expectation 














                                                          
10
 Mentzer et al. (2000); Lambert et al. (2001); Levi et al. (2003); Emmett et al. (2006); Min et al. (2005) 
11
 Czaplewski et al. (2002); House et al. (2001); Langley (2000); Lynch (2001); Min et al. (2005)  
12
 Czaplewski et al. (2002); House et al. (2001); Mentzer et al. (2000); Levi et al. (2003); Lynch (2001); Min  
et al. (2005)  
13 
Mentzer  et al. (2000); Emmett et al. (2006); Min et al. (2005)  
14 
Mentzer et al. (2000)  
15 
Lambert  et al. (2001); Mentzer et al. (2000)  
16 
Czaplewski et al.(2002); Emmett et al. (2006); House  et al. (2001); Mentzer et al. (2000)  
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Kaveh & Samani (2009) are of the view that enablers such as two way information sharing, 
suitable level of investment and right mix of channel partners must be in place before 
commencing of any kind of partnership. Furthermore, the rationale to term them as enablers for 
collaboration is because of their considerable impact on sustaining collaborative relationships in 
case they operated properly.  
 
2.6.5 Benefits of logistics collaboration 
Some of the benefits of supply chain collaboration include lowered inventory risk and costs 
along with decrease in warehousing, distribution and transportation costs (Kaveh & Samani, 
2009). As far as the long term perspective is concerned, it will significantly enhance customer 
responsiveness, increase flexibility for changing market conditions, and lastly improve customer 













           Chapter 3:                                                                                         
Solution Approach 
3.1 Introduction  
The process of supply chain collaboration starts the moment the firm is convinced about entering 
into collaboration. The process of supply chain collaboration consists of three main parts: pre-
qualification of potential partners, partner selection and profit allocation amongst the partners. 
The supplier database considered for this study included 1233 firms. The database included 
important suppliers’ information such as region, country, industry sector, market capitalization 
and international securities identification number (ISIN). The supplier database can be found in 
the CD attached to the thesis. The fact that the database has been developed by Sustainalytics, an 
award winning global investment research firm specialized in environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) research and analysis, it can be safely assumed that all false information is 
excluded from the database. However, the original database had some limitations for our study; 
for instance, it only covered North America and Europe regions. In this competitive global 
market, it is important to include suppliers from China, India and Brazil. Therefore, in order to 
include more multiplicity to our study, a fictitious data is added to cover other regions of the 
world. Since cluster analysis method is more efficient for numeric data rather than mixed data 
sets such as numeric and categorical values, only 29 suppliers are considered for this study. This 
is because assigning numeric data to 1233 firms’ different characteristics can be a daunting task. 
However, an algorithm could have been made to automatically assign numeric data to 1233 
firms’ different characteristics. This is beyond the scope of this thesis. As a result, the database 
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used for the study is fictional. But the pre-qualification method of potential suppliers employed 
in the study can easily be extended to 1233 firms or more and can provide a useful guideline as 
to how methods such as analytical network process (ANP) and cluster analysis can be used in 
conjunction to reduce a large set of potential suppliers to smaller manageable number by ranking 
them according to a pre-defined set of criteria.  
The steps involved in the process of supply chain collaboration in our solution approach are 
summarized in figure 4 as shown below: 
 
Figure 4: Summarization of the steps involved in the process of supply chain collaboration 
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3.2 Process of Partner selection for supply chain collaboration 
3.2.1 Pre-Qualification of Potential Partners 
Holt (1998) defined pre-qualification as “a process of reducing a large set of potential suppliers 
to smaller manageable number by ranking the suppliers under a pre-defined set of criteria”. The  
major benefits of pre-qulification of suppliers are as follows (Holt, 1998): 
1) It reduces the possibility of worthy suppliers being rejected at an early stage. 
2) It optimizes the resource commitment of the buyer toward purchasing process. 
3) By applying pre-selected criteria, the pre-qualification process is streamlined. 
Pre-qualification is a systematic process of ranking several suppliers under conflicting criteria. 
(Ravindran & Warsing, 2012). It is considered to be a multiple-criteria ranking problem that 
needs the buyer to do trade off amongst the conflicting criteria, some of which might be 
qualittative (Holt, 1998). Boer et al. (2001) have mentioned several techniques for pre-
qualification. Some of these techniques include, categorical methods, cluster analysis, data 
environment analysis (DEA) case based reasoning (CBR) systems, and multi-criteria decision 
making method (MCDM). Several authors as cited in Ravindran & Warsing (2012) have 
examined several methods of pre-qualification of suppliers. Weber & Ellram (1992) and Weber 
et al. (2000) have come up with DEA methods for pre-qualification. Hinkel et al. (1969) and 
Holt (1998) have developed cluster analysis for pre-qualification and lastly, NG & Skitmore 
(1995) came up with CBR systems for pre-qualification. 
 
In this thesis, the pre-qualification process of potential suppliers is carried out through 
integration of two methods: cluster analysis and analytical network process (ANP). Initially, 
cluster analysis is performed that will group partners of interest into clusters. Partners of interest 
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are influenced by factors such as industry type, location and market capitalization. The next step 
would be to apply the ANP method so that criteria weight and the partners’ final rating for 
selection process can be determined. The reason behind using both these techniques is to further 
streamline the process of partner selection. In this section, cluster analysis and ANP 
methodologies will be discussed in detail and will provide a framework as to how these two 
techniques can be used during the pre-qualification stage of the supply chain collaboration 
process. 
 
3.2.1.1 Cluster analysis 
The first step of partner selection for supply chain collaboration is to carry out cluster analysis. 
Cluster analysis or clustering is the task of grouping a set of objects in such a way that objects in 
the same group (called cluster) are more similar (in some sense or another) to each other than to 
those in other groups (clusters). The main aim of cluster analysis is that objects within a group 
should be related or similar to one another and distinct from (unrelated) the objects in the other 
groups (Hinkle, et al., 1969). According to Holt (1998), the greater the likeness (homogeneity) 
within a group and larger the variance between groups, the finer or more distinct the clustering.  
In the context of supply chain management, Porter (1998) defines clusters, as “geographic 
concentrations of interconnected firms, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related 
industries, and associated associations in particular fields that compete but also cooperate”. 
Cluster analysis helps to split the set of potential suppliers into small clusters in which the 
clusters grouped together are elements most alike to each other and distinct those from other 
cluster elements (Holt, 1998). In supply chain management, cluster analysis is normally used 
during the pre-qualification stage of supplier selection process. Narrowing down the options 
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helps in facilitating an effective analysis and more thorough scrutiny of the remaining suppliers 
(Timmerman, 1986). This also diminishes the likelihood of refusing good suppliers initially in 
the supplier selection process. In the context of supply chain management, the main aim of 
cluster analysis technique is to filter a large set of potential suppliers into more manageable 
subsets (Holt, 1998). 
The technique is particularly useful for large high dimensional supplier databases.  For instance, 
if a prospective retailer wants collaboration with a food and beverage company located in North 
America region and having a market capitalization of at least $1 million, it will be worthwhile to 
filter out only those prospective suppliers which fulfil these criteria. In our study, cluster analysis 
incorporates three factors of interest: industry type, location and market capitalization. It is 
assumed that the suppliers are all ISO 9000 certified.  
In order to perform cluster analysis, NeuroXL Clusterizer software is used. The software is 
integrated into Microsoft Excel so as to eliminate the need to export data and import the results. 
NeuroXL Clusterizer uses optimized neural network technology to carry out cluster analysis 
quickly and efficiently.  
An excel sheet containing data of 29 suppliers is used. The data includes important information 








Table 5: Potential Suppliers' Data Sets 
No. Name of Company 
 Industry 
Type 
Market cap. (Year end, 
Millions (USD) Country 
1 JBS S.A 1.30 68840.00 5.00 
2 A123 Systems, Inc. 1.80 17.00 1.00 
3 Aaron's, Inc. 1.60 2290.00 2.00 
4 Nestle 1.30 51861.00 5.00 
5 Pepsico 1.30 59749.00 5.00 
6 Unilever 1.30 3922.00 6.00 
7 Accenture Plc. 1.70 45908.00 4.00 
8 Accretive Health, Inc. 1.80 1263.00 2.00 
9 ACE Limited 1.70 28764.00 3.00 
10 Acme Packet, Inc. 1.10 1601.00 4.00 
11 Procter & Gamble 1.30 10952.00 5.00 
12 Activision Blizzard, Inc. 1.30 12584.00 6.00 
13 Adobe Systems Inc. 1.40 19078.00 9.00 
14 ADTRAN Inc. 1.40 1275.00 5.00 
15 Advance Auto Parts Inc. 1.60 5451.00 5.00 
16 
Advanced Micro Devices, 
Inc. 
1.80 1943.00 5.00 
17 Advantage Oil & Gas Ltd. 1.10 535.00 5.00 
18 General Mills 1.30 2732.00 5.00 
19 Kraft 1.30 657.00 8.00 
20 BRF 1.30 1044.00 6.00 
21 Aetna Inc. 1.20 16264.00 9.00 
22 
Affiliated Managers Group 
Inc. 
1.40 7672.00 1.00 
23 Aflac Inc. 1.70 24913.00 2.00 
24 Dole Food Company 1.30 5028.00 5.00 
25 Bunge Limited 1.30 880.00 5.00 
26 Agilent Technologies Inc. 1.20 15413.00 5.00 
27 Sysco Corporation 1.30 4846.00 5.00 
28 Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. 1.20 8463.00 9.00 
29 Grupo Bimbo 1.30 16535.00 5.00 
 







The tables 6 & 7 represent the numeric values assigned to the industry type and country 
respectively.  
As a result of cluster analysis, new groups emerge which includes companies having similar 
characteristics. In chapter 4, numerical example will be provided as to how cluster analysis can 
be performed on supplier database. 
 
3.2.1.2 Analytical Network Process (ANP) 
Analytical network process (ANP) is a combination of two branches. First branch contains 
control hierarchy or network of criteria and sub-criteria which control the interactions present in 
the system under investigation. Second entails a network of influences between the elements and 
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Table 6: Numeric value for industry type 
 
Table 7: Numeric value for region 
 35 
 
analyzed via control hierarchy or a network. A decision network consists of clusters, elements 
and links. A cluster is basically group of related elements. For each control criterion, clusters of 
the system with their elements are identified. Interactions and feedbacks within the clusters are 
known as inner dependencies and interactions between clusters are known as outer dependencies. 
(Saaty, 1999).  
According to Bayazit (2007), inner and out dependencies helps decision makers to apprehend 
and characterize the concepts of influencing and being influenced, amongst clusters and elements 
with regard to a particular element. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons are attained 
methodically which includes all the combinations of element/cluster relationships. ANP employs 
exactly the same comparison scale (1-9) as AHP does. Comparison scale allows the decision 
makers to combine experience and knowledge intuitively (Harker & Vargas, 1990) and specifies 
how many occasions an element dominates another with regard to the criterion. This allows 
decision maker to communicate his preference between each pair of elements as “equally 
important, moderately important, more important, strongly more important, very strongly more 
important, and extremely more important” and these descriptive preferences can then be 
interpreted into numerical values 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 respectively, with 2,4,6 and 8 as intermediate 
values for comparisons amongst two consecutive judgments (Bayazit, 2007). The comparison 








Table 6: Saaty Scale used for Pair-Wise Comparison Matrix 
Intensity of Importance Definition 
1 Equal Importance 
3 Moderate Importance 
5 Strong Importance 
7 Very Strong or Demonstrated Importance 
9 Extreme Importance 
2,4,6,8 
Intermediate values between adjacent 
scale values 
 
The synthesized results eventually come up after the pairwise comparisons. Next, the synthesized 
results of control systems are conjoined so that the best outcome can be determined. As a result 
of that, set of priorities of the alternatives can be found out. Bayazit (2007) explained the step by 
step approach of the ANP methodology as follows: 
 
Step 1: Model development 
Initially, one network for each control criterion is found out. After that, all the criteria that might 
affect the decisions are determined. Next, clusters for each network are found out and one cluster 
will be the alternatives. Finally, the relevant criteria are combined together into the same 
clusters. 
 
Step 2 – Formulating the interdependencies and performing paired comparisons between 
the clusters/elements 
Next, for each control criterion, a cluster versus a cluster matrix is created with one or zero as an 
input depending on whether the left hand side cluster influences or doesn’t influence a cluster 
located at the top of this matrix. Similar process is repeated for criteria versus criteria matrix. 
Again with one or zero as an input and depending on whether a left hand side criteria influences 
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or doesn’t influence criterion situated at the top of this matrix. Paired comparisons of clusters, 
elements and alternatives are performed to obtain eigenvectors and to form super matrix 
(Bayazit, 2007). The paired comparisons are done as follows: 
(A) Cluster comparisons. Firstly, paired comparison is performed on the clusters that 
influence a given cluster with regards to control criterion. As a result, the weights are 
obtained during the process and then they are used to weight the elements in the 
corresponding blocks of the super matrix relating to the control criterion.  
(B) Comparisons of elements: In this, paired comparisons on the elements inside the clusters 
are performed. Then the elements in the cluster are compared depending on their 
influence on an element in another cluster to which they are related (or on the elements in 
their own cluster). 
(C) Comparisons for alternatives. In this, comparison of the alternatives with respect to all 
the elements is carried out.  
 
Step 3 – Constructing the super matrix 
Next, an un-weighted super matrix is obtained. It indicates the pairwise comparisons of the 
criteria. In the un-weighted super matrix, the columns might not be column stochastic. Therefore, 
the blocks of the un-weighted matrix are multiplied by the priority of corresponding influencing 
cluster in order to attain the stochastic matrix. The stochastic matrix comprises of columns that 
all add up to one. Next, the super matrix is raised to large powers in order to capture first, second 
and third degree influences. The powers of the super matrix are raised till the differences 
between consecutive matrix elements reach a really small number. Next, each block is 
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normalized so that final priorities of all the elements in the limit matrix are obtained. The final 
step involves choosing the highest priority alternative (Bayazit, 2007). 
 
3.2.1.2.1 Application of analytical network process (ANP)  
Analytical network process approach was developed by Thomas L. Saaty in 1996 and is 
considered as a generalization of analytic hierarchy process (AHP). According to Saaty (2005), 
ANP uses grid instead of hierarchy used in AHP and enables relations of dependence between 
the clusters and its elements.  
The decision problem in our case is selecting the top ten suppliers after cluster analysis has been 
performed. In the past, partners used to be selected on the basis of few factors such as ability to 
meet quality requirements, price offering and compliance with delivery schedules. But 
nowadays, many other factors seem to be taken into consideration (Muralidharan et al., 2002). In 
the literature review of Cheraghi et al. (2004), 86 papers linked to partner selection factors in the 
timeframe 1990-2001 are summarized. They drew the top 30 most important factors for supplier 
ranking with quality ranking first, delivery second and price third. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2003) 
concluded somewhat similar top three- price first, quality second and delivery third. In the 
nutshell, many factors are important for partner selection but price, quality and delivery were 
concluded to be the top three most important partner selection factors in most of the studies.  
For our study, the factors presumed to be important for collaboration from both the perspectives 
of the suppliers and retailers include performance, compatibility, information technology 
systems, capability, service, risk management and long term relationship. The factors and the 
criterion for each factor are presented in table 7. Retailers usually look for capable, compatible 
and long term oriented suppliers who can provide high quality products at economical prices and 
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can commit to long term relationship. On the other hand, suppliers generally look for retailers 
who are honest, trustworthy and possess state of the art supply chain management information 
systems so that information related to point of sales can be shared freely in a transparent manner.  









Cost of Service 
EDI Capability 
Location (Geographic Spread) 
Strategic Objectives 
Management Attitude 
Information Sharing & Mutual Trust 
IT 
Supply Chain Systems 
Current Technology (Product & Process) 
Communication Systems 
Capability  






Flexibility (payment, freight, price reduction, order frequency and amount 
Ability to modify the product service 
Technical Support 
After Sales Service (Warranties and claims policies 
Risk 
Management 
Willingness to share risk 
Clause for Arbitration and escape 
Long Term 
Relationship  
Long Term Orientation 
Collaboration Possibility 
 
During the process of partner selection, firms should not only consider the financial contribution 
to the alliance, but also take into account other criteria such as top management attitude, 
organizational culture, technical capabilities and long term orientation. Most of the above 
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mentioned criteria are qualitative and cannot be simply assessed by using mathematic 
formulation (Chen et al., 2008). In addition to evaluating how the prospective partner will 
contribute to pre-determined criteria, the firm should check their motivations and priorities for 
going into collaboration. The top level management of a particular firm may have various 
motivations in mind for collaborating but with different priorities in mind, which in turn, 
influences the weighting on criteria for assessing the suitability of prospective partners. On the 
other hand, the method of deciding weights on the criteria also discloses the priority of the 
motivations. This denotes that the relative weights set for each criteria and the priority of 
motivations interact with each other. Therefore when criteria weights are set, the firm should 
evaluate whether its initial priority of motivations is still maintained. If it is still kept, the relative 
weights of these criteria are then used to assess the prospective partners in the selection 
procedure. However in case , it is not kept, the firm should reassess the weighting process or 
evaluate again the weights for the criteria before carrying out the partner evaluation and selection 
process so as to avoid choosing unsuitable partner (Chen et al., 2008). Since interdependence in 
relationships exists in the collaboration criteria, the analytical process network (ANP) method is 
suitable for partner selection for collaboration (Saaty, 2005). In the following sections, we will 
demonstrate the various steps of ANP conducted in super decisions software and the criteria used 
in the decision making process.  
 
Step 1: Model development 
The first step involves identifying clusters, elements and links. After that the network of the 








Figure 5 presents the network model of the problem. It includes clusters, elements and links. As 
can be seen in the figure, the model comprises of 8 clusters (performance, service, compatibility, 
risk management, Information technology (IT), alternatives, long term and capability), each one 
composed by its respective elements shown in figure 5. Ten partners, namely suppliers 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 were considered as alternatives for the selection. The relations between the 
clusters, elements and alternatives are given in figure 5. 
It can be seen in the network model, ANP method allows dependence relations amongst elements 
and clusters. Such relations are denoted by arrows, when the dependence occurs between clusters 
over another cluster. Similarly when there is dependence between elements of the same cluster, it 
is represented by a loop. In case of an arrow from a cluster to another, it’s enough that at least 
one element of the original cluster is associated to an element of the destination cluster (Saaty, 
2005). 
 
Step 2: Determining the interactions between and within clusters and elements 
The next step is to determine interactions between and within clusters and elements. For our 
model, we defined 8 clusters. The clusters and elements within the clusters along with their 
interdependencies are defined as follows: 
 
1. Performance  
This criterion defines the anticipated performance from the prospective partners. It has 4 sub-
criteria as shown below: 
1.1. Quality performance  
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It is assumed to be dependent on cost, current technology, financial position and production 
facilities & capacity. Obviously, if the firm has a better financial position, it can afford to 
enhance its quality performance by upgrading existing technology or buying state of the art 
production equipment.  
  
1.2. Delivery  
The partner’s ability to deliver products to its customers on time depends on how effectively and 
efficiently firm develops those products. Lead times, location and supply chain systems are also 
important aspects which can affect the delivery. Therefore, delivery is assumed to be dependent 
on development speed, lead times, and location and supply chain systems.  
 
1.3. Lead times 
Lead time refers to the time it takes for the partner to develop and deliver the goods to the 
customer. It's dependent on communication system, development speed, EDI capability, 
forecasting capabilities, information sharing & trust, location and production facilities & 
capacity since all these factors play an important part in either increasing or decreasing the lead 
times. 
 
1.4. Development speed  
Development speed depends on the current technological processes in place, information sharing 
between the customer and the supplier, lead times (how long the partner’s supplier takes to 




2. Compatibility   
Compatibility criterion basically gives an indication whether the prospective supplier is 
compatible in terms of cost, location, strategic objectives, management attitude, information 
sharing & trust and EDI capability.  
2.1. Cost  
It is dependent on financial position and location. Obviously, if a partner is located in China, it 
can hire cheap labour and, in turn, offer reduced prices to its collaborating partner. If the 
financial position of the partner is good, then it is likely that partner would offer reasonable price 
to its collaborating partner in the hope that it will result in long term relationship. 
 
2.2. EDI capability 
The EDI capability criteria are assumed to be dependent on cost, communication systems, 
financial position, and management attitude and supply chain systems since it involves lot of 
communication between the collaborating partners and thus it required for the prospective 
partners to either acquire this capability or may be upgrade its EDI capability  in case if it is non-
compatible. This requires dedicated efforts from the management and also substantial costs may 
be involved. 
 
2.3. Location  
Location is dependent on strategic objectives since some firms objective may be to access new 
markets through collaboration or some firms just want to exploit the gains of cheap labour in a 




2.4. Strategic objectives 
They are dependent on collaboration possibility, cost, financial position, information sharing & 
trust, location, long term orientation, management attitude and willingness to share risk. These 
aspects play an important role in determining the firm’s strategic objectives.  
 
2.5. Management attitude 
This is dependent on cost, forecasting capability, flexibility, collaboration possibility, financial 
position, information sharing & trust, location, long term orientation, strategic objectives and 
willingness to share risk. This is because if there exists a chance of collaboration, it is likely that 
the management attitude will be influence by that possibility. 
 
2.6. Information sharing & trust 
This is dependent on communication systems, collaboration possibility, flexibility, forecasting 
capabilities, long term orientation, strategic objectives and management attitude. Obviously, if 
the firm is convinced that its prospective partner’s communication systems are safe to transmit 
information without worrying that the sensitive information will reach its competitors and if the 
prospective partner is willing to enter into collaboration for a long time, it is likely, that the firm 
will be comfortable with the idea of sharing information. 
 
3. Information Technology (IT) 





3.1. Supply chain systems 
These are dependent on cost and financial position. A wealthy firm can afford to install modern 
supply chain systems or upgrade it to be compatible with its prospective partner’s one. 
 
3.2. Current technology (product & process) 
This is dependent on cost and financial position. A firm in good financial state can afford to 
upgrade its existing technology or buy new one. 
 
3.3. Communication systems 
These are dependent on current technology and location. This is because if the prospective 
partner is based at a considerable distance from the firm, it might have to upgrade its existing 
technology or look for a partner whose is located nearby. 
 
4. Capability  
The capability criterion gives an indication about how capable the prospective partners are.  
4.1. Production facilities & capacity 
These are dependent on cost, financial position and location. Production facilities will be modern 
if the financial position of the firm is good and in turn it can offer goods at a reduced cost since 
economies of scale can be realized as a result of modern production facilities and capacity.  
 
4.2. Surge capacity 
This is dependent on cost, development speed, financial position, reciprocal arrangements and 
strategic objectives. Only a firm which has a good financial state can think about adding 
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additional equipment so in order to meet the demand at peak times. In this case, the partner 
might ask for a higher price so as to overcome the additional expenses incurred on adding 
additional machineries. 
 
4.3. Reciprocal arrangements 
These are dependent on cost, financial position, and strategic objectives. It incurs additional costs 
to have reciprocal arrangements. 
 
4.4 Financial position 
This is dependent on cost of service. A firm in a good financial state can offer price discounts to 
its customer hence the cost of service will be low in that case. 
 
4.5 Forecasting capabilities 
These are dependent on communication systems, current technology, EDI capability, supply 
chain systems, information sharing & trust and location. Accurate forecasting can only happen if 
there exists a proper channel which can facilitate information sharing and trust between the 
collaborating partners.   
 
5. Service  
The service criterion gives an indication regarding how helpful or flexible the prospective 
partners can be in terms of flexibility, ability to modify product or service, technical support and 
after sales service. 
5.1 Flexibility (Payment, freight and Price Reduction) 
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This is dependent on collaboration possibility, financial position, long term orientation, 
management attitude and strategic objectives. Possibility of a long term relationship acts as an 
incentive for firms to offer flexibility in terms of payments.  
 
5.2 Ability to modify product & service 
This is dependent on current technology, information sharing & trust, lead times, production 
facilities & capacity and supply chain systems. Information sharing can help prospective partners 
to better understand the each other requirements thus making it easier to modify product or 
service quickly.  
 
5.3 Technical Support 
This is at the discretion of the management to decide how much technical support to offer to 
customers after a product or service has been bought from them. 
  
5.4 After Sales Service (Warranties & Claim Service) 
This depends on management attitude, collaboration possibility and strategic objectives. If the 
firm is interested in engaging in long term collaboration with the prospective partner then it will 
likely consider providing good after-sales service. 
 
6. Risk Management 





6.1 Willingness to Share Risk 
This depends on cost of service, financial position, information sharing & trust, management 
attitude and strategic objectives. If the financial state of the firm is not good enough, then it 
might not be willing to share the risk equally. Similarly, if it is charging high amount of money 
from its customer then it can think about sharing risk with its customer 
 
6.2 Clause for Arbitration & Escape 
This is dependent on management attitude and strategic objectives. Because strategic objectives 
can require a firm to have strict clauses for arbitration and escape so it can be difficult for the 
partner to leave collaboration. It also depends on the attitude of the management.  
 
7. Long Term Relationship 
This aspect relates to the possibility of a long term relationship between the prospective partners. 
7.1 Long Term Orientation  
This is dependent on all the sub criterions as mentioned above. All sub-criterions are equally 
important when considering long term relationship. 
 
7.2 Collaboration Possibility 
Collaboration possibility also depends on all the sub-criterions mentioned above. 





















































































































Figure 6: Interactions between and within clusters and elements for “Performance, 
Capability and Service”. 
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Figure 8: Interactions between and within clusters and elements for “Long Term 
Orientation and Collaboration Possibility 
  
 
Step 3: Pairwise comparisons 
In step 3, the decision makers set their preferences through the development of the comparison 
matrices of the clusters, elements and rating, based on Saaty’s fundamental scale. The 
comparisons to be made are those in which an element of a cluster has a relation of dependence 
with at least two elements of another cluster. Moreover, pairwise comparison of each element 
with respect to the adopted ratings is made.    
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Step 4: Development of super matrices 
After pairwise comparisons, the un-weighted and weighted super matrixes along with limit 
matrix are developed. The un-weighted super matrix comprises of priority vectors placed in 
columns, gained through pairwise comparisons. Details about super matrices will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 4 i.e. numerical application. Finally, the rankings of the alternative partners are 
obtained and top 10 suppliers are shortlisted. 
 
3.3 Partner selection 
Partner selection is procedure of identifying ideal partners that can provide right quality products 
and/or services at the right place, at right quantities and at the right time (Sonmez, 2006). Proper 
identification of potential partners is of utmost importance for achieving successful supply chain 
management (Lasch & Janker, 2005). Proper identification of partner selection decreases the 
purchasing costs and also enhances corporate competitiveness (Ghodsypour & Brien, 2001).  
In the partner selection process for collaboration, identification of suitable decision making 
criteria for choosing the right partner is of utmost importance. The decision making criteria to be 
used for partner selection will vary across a variety of industries. For example, in pharmaceutical 
industry, the most important criteria would be health and safety considerations, followed by 
quality and delivery. Similarly, in automobile industry, reliability, durability and quality would 
be the three most important selection factors. In the context of supply chain collaboration, the 
prospective partners’ decision whether to engage in collaboration with each other or not is to a 




According to Kuo & Lin (2011), selection of suitable partners is one of the essential strategies of 
improving the product quality of any organization since it directly influences companies’ 
reputations. The task of partner selection is more complicated especially in case different 
partners are already collaborating and want to select a partner for improving the sustainability of 
their supply chain collaborative network (Saiz & Rodríguez, 2010). 
Bhutta & Huq (2002) are of the view that partner selection process needs consideration of 
multiple objectives and thus can be regarded as a multi-criteria decision making problem 
(MCDM). MCDM approaches comprise of a set of concepts, methods and techniques that aim to 
facilitate individuals or groups to make decisions involving multiple criteria and multiple agents 
(Saiz & Rodríguez, 2010). In this regard, several multi criteria approaches have been suggested 
for solving partner selection problems; these include multi-objective programming (MOP), 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and analytic network process (ANP) and vendor profile 
analysis (VPA) (Cheng, 2007). ANP method, developed by Saaty, allows in resolving problems 
that entail both qualitative and quantitative criteria as well as take into consideration the 
interdependence and feedback among these criteria.  
In this thesis, we will use game theory for collaboration partner selection. The various details of 
game theory are presented as follows: 
 
3.3.1 Game theory introduction 
According to Myerson (1991) game theory is defined as “the study of mathematical models of 
conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers. Game theory provides 
general mathematical techniques for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make 
decisions that will influence one another’s welfare”.  
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It offers tools, methods and models to examine coordination, collaboration, and competition in 
the context of supply chain management (Meca & Timmer, 2007). Game theory is considered to 
be an important tool with regards to supply chain management problems involving multiple 
agents (retailer, manufacturer, buyer, government etc.), with conflicting objectives (Cachon & 
Serguei, 2004). It helps in facilitating decision makers to improve the cooperative effectiveness 
of the partners involved (Zhu & Dou, 2010).  
Different entities in the supply chain are known as players. A “game” in the context of supply 
chain management has four main components (Froeb & McCann, 2008): 
1. The players (potential supply chain partners e.g. supplier, retailer, manufacturer, distributor 
etc.) 
2. The rules that confine the game (e.g., laws, customer deadlines etc.) 
3. A set of decisions or selections that the players might execute (involve or not involve) 
4. The payoffs as a result of making those selections. 
 
3.3.1.1. Classification of the game 
Traditionally, game theory can be divided into two branches: non-cooperative and cooperative 
game theory. In the supply chain management literature, most academic articles and journal 
papers have, over the past few years, focused only on the application of non-cooperative game 
theory. On the other hand, papers applying cooperative game theory to study supply chain 
management didn’t receive much attention. According to Cachon & Netessine (2003), the 
application of cooperative game theory, in the context of supply chain, is scarce as compared 
with non-cooperative game theory, owing to the rising trend of bargaining and negotiations in 
supply chain relationships. In addition, a non-cooperative game clearly specifies the options, 
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incentives and information of the “players” and tries to predict how the players will play the 
game whereas cooperative game theory only concentrates on the outcome of the game in terms 
of value generated as a result of cooperation of a subset of players (Cachon & Netessine, 2003). 




In non-cooperative games, the players select their strategies simultaneously and stay firm on 
their selected strategies (Cachon & Netessine, 2003). It is not possible for players to collaborate 
or communicate in any way and therefore, it is impossible for them to make binding 
commitments before selecting their strategies (Nash, 1953). Non-cooperative game theory 
investigates regarding what action one might expect from the players (Nagarajan and Sosic, 
2008), the emphasis being on the specific actions of the players (Cachon, 2004). In this type of 
game, numerous equilibrium solutions have been recommended such as dominant strategy, Nash 
equilibrium, and sub game perfect equilibrium (Damme, 1991). 
 
Nash equilibrium: Strategies selected by all players are supposed to be in Nash equilibrium state 
provided that no player can benefit by changing only their own strategy unilaterally (Osborne & 
Rubinstein, 1994). According to Nash (1950), every finite game contains at least one Nash 
equilibrium solution. 
 
Dominant strategy: It is the strategy which accomplishes the highest payoff and is considered to 




Sub-game perfect equilibrium: Strategies in an extensive form are said to be in sub-game perfect 
equilibrium provided that the strategies constitute Nash equilibrium at all decision points. 
 
Cooperative  
In a cooperative game, it is possible for players to enter into binding commitments and therefore, 
players can make side-payments and form coalitions (Cachon & Netessine, 2003). Cooperative 
game basically studies the set of likely outcomes and examines what the players can attain, what 
kind of coalitions will form and how will the coalitions that are formed, will divide the outcome 
and whether the outcomes are robust and steady (Nagarajan & Sosic, 2006). It directly looks at 
the set of possible outcomes, studies what the players can achieve, what coalitions will form, 
how the coalitions formed will divide the outcome, and whether the outcomes are stable and 
robust (Nagarajan & Sosic, 2006). Cooperative game theory does not examine the behavior of 
the individual players and assumes that once the coalition is formed, the coordination between 
them is attained one way or the other (i.e. attained either by having binding agreements and 
assurances or through an appropriate coordination procedure) (Meca & Judith 2007). 
In cooperative game theory, a solution concept is one which fulfills a set of assumptions. The 
important ones are as follows: 
  
 
Pareto optimality: Total utility is one in which total utility assigned to each player is equal to the 
total utility of the game. 
 
Individual rationality: Individual rationality is one in which each player should be allocated 




Kick-back: This requires that players be assigned a utility which is always non-negative.  
 
Monotonicity: Monotonicity requires that the allocation to a player should be higher in case the 
overall utility increases.  
 
Zero sum  
Basically, in zero sum games, the profits of all the players are equal to the losses of the players. 
This means that total winnings sans the total losses for any set of strategies chosen in the whole 
game must be zero (Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944). Tennis, chess and boxing are example of 
zero sum games because in these games, one player’s win is the other’s loss.   
 
Non zero-sum games 
In non-zero sum games, the combined gains and losses of the players in the game can be either 
larger than or smaller than zero (Ken & Binmore, 2007). In other words, there is a possibility for 
all players involved to either gain or lose together. Examples where non-zero games are used 
includes stock markets, international trades, information exchange etc.  
 
Player  
The participants of the game are known as players. In the context of supply chain management, 
the players can either refer to manufacturer, supplier, retailer, shipper or a distributor. It is 
possible to think multiple entities, such as the ones specified above as one player provided that 
those entities are working in coordination with each other. An example of this scenario will be 
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when a group of retailers, let’s say five, is thinking about entering into collaboration with a 
single big supplier. In this case, group of retailers will be considered as a single player.  
 
Strategy 
A player’s strategy, in the context of game theory, corresponds to one of the selections he can 
make in a situation in which the outcome is dependent not only on his own actions but on the 
action of others (Polak , 2007). In other words, strategy refers to action or series of actions that 
defines all the possible choices a player can make in every situation. There can be two types of 
games: simultaneous and sequential. In simultaneous games, the players make decisions without 
knowing the decisions of their opponents. In sequential games such as chess, each player gets to 
know the previous decisions of the other player’s.  
 
Payoff 
Payoff is basically an outcome a player gets after an action or series of actions has been executed 
by the participating players. The payoff can either be positive or negative.  
    
3.3.2 Application of Game theory for partner selection    
Supply chain comprises of a number of decentralized companies who have the prospect of 
working jointly (Meirvenne & Raa, 2011). Decisions taken by an individual firm in the supply 
chain will influence the profit of other firms in the supply chain and hence the profit of the 
supply chain as a whole (Nash, 1953). According to Cachon (2004), game theory is a good way 
to demonstrate decision making in a situation involving various interdependent entities where the 
outcome is dependent on the selection made by every entity. In the context of partner selection, 
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game theory tries to model and analyze strategic situations, including various forms of game 
appropriate for different settings (Nagarajan & Sosic, 2008). In case of partner selection, it will 
exhibit the likely response of the partners’ under different conditions. Game theory assumes that 
each player attempts to maximize their own value while assuming that other players are also 
doing exactly the same and that the decisions made by other players’ affect each other’s values 
(Nagarajan & Sosic, 2008).  
After application of ANP method, there is one question that remains unanswered; what type of 
collaboration will be best for each partner and what will be the likely reaction of potential 
partners’ for each type of collaboration. After shortlisting the number of partners through cluster 
analysis and analytical process network approach, it cannot be assumed that prospective partners 
will readily agree to enter into collaboration. This is because it might not be in the best interest of 
a particular partner to enter into collaboration whereas it might be beneficial for the other one. In 
order to determine the win-win solution from the perspective of each partner, a non-cooperative 
game is designed in where partners make decisions independently in a manner which maximizes 
their own payoffs. The solution of non-cooperative game is Nash equilibrium. 
During the initial stages of partner selection for collaboration, the main focus is on predicting the 
outcome of the game instead of focusing on specific actions taken by the players. As a result, this 
problem is structured as a non-cooperative game. In a non-cooperative game, cooperation 
between partners must be self-enforcing as oppose to cooperative game where players enforce 
contracts through third parties. A non-cooperative game clearly specifies the options, incentives 
and information of the “players” and tries to predict how the players will play the game. In our 
study, we assumed that each partner has three choices of collaboration to make: full 
collaboration, partial collaboration or no collaboration.  
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Incentives for each partner can vary depending on the needs of a particular partner. For instance, 
retailer might be interested in reducing its inventory related costs. For that reason, it would prefer 
to enter into partial collaboration with the supplier. In partial collaboration, the retailer can get a 
complete refund from the supplier in case the goods are not sold to the end customer. On the 
other hand, the incentive for supplier going into partial collaboration with the retailer would be 
reduction in operating costs as a result of better forecasts, reduced demand variability and better 
information for sales & operations planning (S&OP). In this case, it seems both the retailer and 
the supplier seem to be benefiting from entering into partial collaboration with each other. 
However, in case, supplier and retailer decide to enter into partial collaboration with each other, 
they need to examine the total switching costs and the net benefits to be realized as a result of 
choosing partial collaboration. In addition, the total switching costs, and the net benefits for other 
types of collaboration also need to be examined. Only then partners will be in a good position to 
make a decision as to which form of collaboration will best suit them.  
During the modelling of the game, it is assumed that collaboration, whether partial or full, will 
ultimately result in cost savings more than that of “no collaboration”. Therefore, the decisive 
factor which plays an important part during the decision making process of the partners is total 
switching costs. During analysis, for example, if the net benefits are high and total switching 
costs are low for partial collaboration for both the retailer and the supplier with respect to other 
types of collaboration; the dominant strategy for the partners would be to enter into partial 
collaboration with each other. In this case, the partners are said to be in Nash equilibrium 






In order to investigate the collaboration mechanism, three modes of collaboration i.e. full 
collaboration, partial collaboration and no collaboration are proposed in the study. These modes 
of collaboration are basically developed through a combination of wide range of supply chain 
contracts such as buy back contracts, quantity flexibility contracts, revenue sharing contracts, 
quantity discount contracts, and sales rebate contracts. The modes are developed under the 
assumption that collaboration, be it partial or full, will ultimately result in maximizing the total 
revenue of the supplier as well as that of the retailer and neither supplier nor retailer has anything 
to gain by changing only their own strategy unilaterally. However, the characteristics under each 
mode are subject to change in case supplier or retailer doesn’t agree. In this case, it is assumed 
that the modes of collaboration are developed by the retailer. The characteristics of each mode of 
collaboration are defined as follows: 
 
Full collaboration 
In full collaboration, the partner and the retailer work like a single entity. The characteristics 
when both the retailer and the supplier work in full collaboration are as follows: 
• The administration costs are shared equally between the supplier and the retailer. 
• Inventory costs are shared equally. Retailer’s warehouses and supplier’s warehouses may 
be combined into a single warehouse or alternatively the operational costs of running the 
warehouses are shared equally by both the retailer and supplier.  
• Transportation costs are equally shared between the supplier and retailer.  
• Production costs are equally shared. 
• Centralized information sharing. 
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• The profit from the sales of the goods is equally shared between the retailer and the 
supplier. 
• Costs such as system implementation, operational, partnership instability and switching 
are shared equally between the partners. 
• Joint decisions on strategic issues such as production capacities, product design, portfolio 
joint marketing and pricing plans.  
• Information sharing on topics such as bill of materials (BOM), orders, product 
descriptions, prices & promotions, product & material availability and service levels.  
 
Partial collaboration 
In partial collaboration, limited resources are shared between the supplier and the retailer. The 
characteristics of partial collaboration relationship between the supplier and the retailer are as 
follows: 
• The inventory is completely managed and owned by the supplier until the retailer 
sells it. This means the administration costs increase at the supplier’s end. 
• The supplier decides on the appropriate inventory levels of each of the products and 
appropriate inventory policies. 
• Since inventory is completely managed by the supplier, the inventory costs are 
endured by the supplier alone.  
• Transportation costs are fully endured by the supplier. 
• Costs such as system implementation, operational, partnership instability and 
switching are borne separately by each partner. 
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• Information sharing on topics such as bill of materials (BOM), orders, product 
descriptions, prices & promotions, product & material availability and service levels.  
 
No collaboration  
In no collaboration, supplier and retailer work like separate entities. There is no information 
sharing on topics such as bill of materials (BOM), orders, product descriptions, prices & 
promotions, product & material availability and service levels. Other features of no collaboration 
are as follows: 
• The retailer decides on how much to order.  
• The inventory costs are endured separately by the retailer and the supplier (Assuming 
both operate a warehouse and keep inventory stock). 
• The administration costs are endured separately by both the supplier and the retailer. 
• Production costs are endured by the supplier. 
• Transportation costs endured separately by both the supplier and the retailer assuming 
both have a warehouse. 
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Table 8: Costs Characteristics of three different types of collaborations 
 
During development of these collaboration modes, phenomenon of counterfeit and refurbished 
products has been taken into consideration. Counterfeit and refurbished products have become a 
growing problem in supply chains and have attained significant ground in most of the industries 
including pharmaceutical, electronics, automotive, consumer products, food and beverage and 
aerospace. Counterfeiting can impact the stakeholders in a typical supply chain in a number of 
ways. For example, it can result in lower profits, lost sales and decline in brand equity. As a 
result of counterfeit and refurbished products, end customers receive substandard, unregulated 
and unsafe products which can pose a risk to their health and safety. As a consequence, this will 
likely result in customer dissatisfaction, which in turn, would lead to decline in sales and lower 
profits. Therefore, it is important for a prospective firm, who is considering collaboration, to 




provision of high quality original products. In order to account for the possibility of counterfeit 
and refurbished products being sold to the prospective firm(s), they must have appropriate 
reactive and proactive measures in place to deal with any kind of eventuality. The framework 
suggested in our study incorporates two factors namely quality performance and risk 
management. Quality performance factor ensures that firm is being proactive by having adequate 
quality control standards to prevent any fake or refurbished products being sold to them. On the 
other hand, risk management factor includes a strict penalty clause and comprehensive insurance 
policy to account for any potential loss of sales or brand equity in case of buying counterfeit or 
refurbished product from their collaborating partner. 
 
Formulation of game 
 Players: Players refer to potential partners contemplating about entering into 
collaboration.  
 Strategy: Strategy refers to complete plan of action a player will select given the set of 
circumstances that might arise within the game. In this case, the partners’ have three 
strategies to choose from i.e. full collaboration, partial collaboration or no collaboration. 
 Payoff: It refers to the payout a player gets from arriving at a particular outcome. The 
payout can be in any measurable form, from currency to utility.  
 Equilibrium: A point in the game where both players have reached their decisions and an 
outcome is achieved.  
 Static and Dynamic Settings: The total additional switching costs are borne only once by 
the retailer (s) and/or supplier(s) as a result of entering into either partial collaboration or 
full collaboration mode with each other. Inventory carrying cost, transportation cost, 
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production fixed cost, administration cost, fixed ordering cost and inventory holding cost 
are conisdered to be variable costs and are expected to change over period of time.    
 
Assumptions and major variables 
a) The ultimate aim of the players is to maximize their profits. 
b) There are three types of strategies that players can choose from: full collaboration, partial 
collaboration and non-collaboration.  
c) In each mode, the price, unit cost and the incremental cost of the product are different. 
d) The supply and demand of the products will be different under different categories. 
e) Each of the two enterprises has an accurate understanding of characteristics and utility 
but not the action of the other enterprise before making decisions.  
 
3.3.2.1 Game theoretical analysis 
The solution concept of a non-cooperative game is Nash equilibrium. In the context of supply 
chain collaboration, for example, Supplier (A) and Retailer (B) are said to be in Nash 
Equilibrium if Supplier (A) is making the best decision it can, taking into consideration 
Retailer’s (B) decision, and Retailer (B) is taking the best decision it can, taking into account 
Supplier’s (A) decision. Similarly, a group of players such as retailers and/or suppliers are said to 
be in Nash Equilibrium if each one is making the best decision it can while taking into 
consideration the decisions of others.  
In order to find the solution of a non-cooperative game, the payoff matrix of the game needs to 
be determined. Once the payoff matrix is determined, the next step is carrying out Nash 
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equilibrium analysis. Before determining the payoff matrix, payoff functions needs to be 
developed.  




 :  payoff of the supply chain collaboration at different modes;    represents the expected 
Payoff at “No - Collaboration Mode”;    represents the expected Payoff at “Partial 
Collaboration Mode”;   represents the expected Payoff at “Full Collaboration” mode. 
 
        Inventory carrying cost 
      Transportation cost 
      Production fixed cost for the supplier 
       Administration cost 
Q: Q =Quanitity of items sold 
  : W =Unit selling price of the supplier 
     = Unit production cost of the supplier 
     = Expected Revenue of the supplier 
     = Expected Profit of the supplier 
      Implementation cost  
      Operational cost    
      Partnership opportunity cost  
  :K= Fixed ordering cost (everytime retailer places an order) 
  :H= Expected inventory holding cost for the retailer 
   = Q= Quantity of items sold 
  = p= Selling price 
  =c= Cost price  
   = System implementation and integration cost 
   = Partnership instability cost  
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1. The payoff function PF for supplier in a non-collaboration arrangement with the retailer 
is given by  
    = (   –   )    -     +    +        )                                                            Equation 3.1 
 
2. The payoff function PF for retailer in a non-collaboration arrangement with the supplier 
is given by  
    = (   –   ))     -     +   +  )                                                                         Equation 3.2 
 
3. The payoff function PF for supplier in a partial collaboration arrangement with the 
retailer is given by  
    =   (   –   )    – (    +    +             )                                           Equation 3.3 
 
4. The payoff function PF for retailer in partial collaboration arrangement with the 
supplier is given by  
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   = (   –   )    – (       +    +  +      ) Equation 3.4 
 
5. The payoff function PF for supplier in a full collaboration arrangement with the retailer 
is given by  
   =  (   –   )     – {     +    +        ) +      /2}                                      Equation 3.5 
 
6. The payoff functions PF for retailer in a full collaboration arrangement with the 
supplier is given by 
    =  (   –   )     – {     +    +        ) +      /2}                                    Equation 3.6 
 
Payoff Matrix  
The next step after determining payoff functions is to transform them into a payoff matrix as 
shown below in table 9. 



















    ,          ,          ,      
Partial 
Collaboration 
    ,          ,          ,      





The retailers’ three possible strategies—full collaboration, partial collaboration, or no 
collaboration—form the rows of the matrix. Similarly, the suppliers’ three possible strategies— 
full collaboration, partial collaboration and no collaboration —form the columns of the matrix. 
Each cell of the matric represents the players’ payoffs under different strategies. For each 
outcome, row’s payoff i.e. retailers’ payoff is always listed first, followed by column’s payoff 
i.e. suppliers’ payoff.  
For instance, the upper left hand corner above depicts that when a retailer or a group of retailers 
forms “full collaboration” partnership with a supplier or a group of suppliers, the retailer or the 
group of retailers gets a payoff of       and the supplier or a group of suppliers gets a payoff 
of     . 
 
3.3.2.2 Nash equilibrium analysis 
The game between retailer(s) and/or supplier(s) can have multiple Nash equilibriums depending 
on the payoff functions. Some of the possible Nash equilibriums are as follows: 
By examining the possible pairs of actions, we observe that (Partial Collaboration, Full 
Collaboration) and (Partial Collaboration, Partial Collaboration) could be one of the Nash 
equilibriums under certain conditions.   
 
1. (Partial Collaboration, Full Collaboration) 
The action pair (Partial Collaboration, Full Collaboration) is a Nash Equilibrium because (i) 
given player 2 i.e. the supplier chooses full collaboration, player 1 i.e. retailer is better off 
choosing partial collaboration rather than “full collaboration” or “no collaboration”. The strategy 
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(Full Collaboration, Partial Collaboration) is a pure Nash strategy which could exist when the 
following equations are being satisfied: 
 
     +     +      +     ) >       +     +      +     )                                                 Equation A 
  
     +     +      +    ) >        +     +      +     )                                               Equation B 
 
Equation A indicates that when the additional costs required for the supplier to switch to partial 
collaboration mode are higher than switching to full collaboration mode, the dominant strategy 
for the supplier would be to go for full collaboration. Given player 2 goes with full collaboration, 
the expected additional costs of the retailer at the full collaboration mode are higher than at the 
partial collaboration mode. So, the dominant strategy for the retailer would be to go with partial 
collaboration.  
Additionally, when the above equations are being met, the retailer’s expected payoff is likely to 
be higher in partial collaboration mode than that in “full collaboration” or “no collaboration” 
mode. This is because in full collaboration, the administration costs, inventory costs, 
transportation costs and production costs are to be shared equally between the supplier and the 
retailer. Therefore     i.e total costs involved in switching to full collaboration are likely to be 
higher as compared to partial collaboration or no collaboration mode. In partial collaboration, all 
major costs like production, inventory, and transportation are to be endured by the supplier. In no 
collaboration, it is likely that the inventory costs and transportation costs are likely to be more 




(ii) given that the player 1 i.e. retailer chooses partial collaboration, player 2 i.e. supplier is better 
off choosing full collaboration than partial collaboration because the additional costs required for 
the supplier to switch to partial collaboration mode are higher than switching to full collaboration 
mode as depicted in equation A. Apart from total switching costs, all other major costs such as 
inventory, production, transportation and administration costs are to be endured alone by the 
supplier. The supplier will own the inventory until it is sold by the retailer. Therefore, there are 
substantial risks involved for the supplier.      
Full collaboration might not be in the best interest of the retailer because any inefficiency from 
the supplier’s part might prove to be costly for the retailer since the total costs are to be shared 
between the two entities. The retailer has no control over some of the costs like “production 
costs”, inventory costs” and “transportation costs”. Yet the retailer has to share these costs along 
with the supplier. The inventory costs are substantial and the inventory policies are likely to be 
taken by the supplier rather than the retailer in full collaboration mode. However, in partial 
collaboration, inventory costs, transportation costs and administration costs are full endured by 
the supplier alone rather than the retailer. In this situation, the retailer is better off since major 
costs are met by the supplier. But in partial collaboration, the retailer might not get the massive 
discounts as in the case of the full collaboration. In partial collaboration, the total cost increases 
at the supplier’s end but these costs can be offset by charging more from the retailer. In case of 
increasing the prices of goods from the retailers’, this will result in retailer charging more from 
the end customer. As a result, the demand for the products can diminish which, in turn, can lead 
to the retailer ordering fewer quantities of goods. As a result, the total supply chain profit i.e. net 




2. (Partial Collaboration, Partial Collaboration) 
The second action pair (partial collaboration, partial collaboration) is a Nash equilibrium because 
(i) given player 2 i.e. the supplier chooses partial collaboration, player 1 i.e. retailer is better off 
choosing partial collaboration rather than “full collaboration” or “no collaboration”. In partial 
collaboration, the below mentioned condition applies:  
 
     +     +      +     ) <       +     +      +     )                                                 Equation C 
 
     +     +      +    ) <        +     +      +     )                                               Equation D 
 
Equation C indicates that when the additional costs required for the supplier to switch to partial 
collaboration mode are lower than switching to full collaboration mode, the dominant strategy 
for the supplier would be to go for partial collaboration strategy. Given that supplier goes with 
partial collaboration, the expected additional costs of the retailer at the full collaboration mode 
are higher than at the partial collaboration mode. So, the dominant strategy for the retailer would 
be to also go with partial collaboration with the supplier.  
Moreover, the retailer’s expected payoff is likely to be higher in partial collaboration mode than 
that in “full collaboration” or “no collaboration” mode. This is because in partial collaboration, 
the supplier is able to control the lead time component of order point better than a customer with 
thousands of suppliers they have to deal with. In partial collaboration, the supplier takes on a 
greater responsibility to have the products available when needed, therefore lowering the need 
for safety stock for the retailer. The retailer also doesn’t need to operate a warehouse since the 
ownership of the inventory gets completely transferred to the supplier which results in 
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substantial inventory cost savings. Apart from that the supplier also keeps track of inventory 
movement and takes over responsibility of product availability resulting in reduction of stock 
outs, there-by increasing end customer satisfaction. This also helps the retailer to curtail costs on 
the forecasting and the purchasing activities since it becomes the responsibility of the supplier to 
do forecasting. As a consequence of that, the retailer is likely to see increase in sales owing to 
less stock out situations as customers will find the right product at right time. It also decreases 
administrative costs because the supplier takes on most of the responsibility of restocking and 
calculation order point which ultimately helps purchasing department to spend less time issuing 
and reconciling purchase orders. 
 
 (ii) Given that the player 1 i.e. retailer chooses partial collaboration, player 2 i.e. supplier is 
better off choosing partial collaboration than full collaboration or no collaboration strategy. This 
is because in partial collaboration, the additional costs of switching to partial collaboration mode 
are less than the costs for switching to full collaboration mode as shown in equation C. 
Moreover, in this mode, suppliers are in better position to ascertain how the retailer is going to 
place the orders. In partial collaboration, usually, the retailer sends the point of sale (POS) data 
directly to the supplier, which in turn, improves the visibility and results in better forecasting. 
Even though the supplier takes on the responsibility for replenishment, the savings in operating 
costs alone can easily offset the costs of going into partial collaboration. As a result of going into 
partial collaboration, the supplier can achieve tactical cost savings which includes reduced 
administrative and operating costs due to fewer order problems caused by bad data. Apart from 
tactical cost savings, supplier can also achieve strategic operating cost savings in the form of 
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reduced finished goods inventory requirements owing to reduced demand variability, better 
forecasts, and better information for Sales & Operations Planning (S&OP). 
 
3.3.3 Collaboration model development 
When the partners enter into collaboration, wide range of costs is incurred.      and      
represents the additional costs that will be incurred to the retailer as a result of entering into 
partial collaboration and full collaboration modes respectively with the supplier.  
Similarly,      and       represents the additional costs that will be incurred to the supplier as a 
result of switching into partial collaboration and full collaboration modes respectively with the 
retailer.  
These additional costs have four components as mentioned previously in section 3.3.2. The 
details about these cost components are as follows: 
    represents cost of system implementation and integration costs, coordinating and integrating 
business process among partners, and translating and integrating data among systems.  
    represents the operational cost of running collaborative systems. This includes salaries of 
additional personnel to be hired specifically for running and maintaining collaborative systems 
and costs incurred as a result of operating those collaborative systems.  
    denotes the value of the benefits missed out by not implementing a more beneficial 
partnership (Gibbons, 1995). In other words, it is the cost incurred by not exploiting the 
advantage that would be had by adopting a more productive relationship with the partner.    
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    signifies costs of switching partners. The costs are considerably high as a result of switching 
partners. For instance, inflexible systems such as EDI involves high costs for switching to other 
partners which leads to greater partnership opportunity cost (Poirier & Bauer, 2001). 
Therefore, when partners are faced with the decision of choosing between non-cooperative and 
cooperative strategies,                        , which denote the additional costs to be borne 
individually by each retailer and the supplier in case of switching to partial collaboration or full 
collaboration mode respectively, are crucial during the decision making process of collaboration. 
Great emphasis is placed by the partners on these costs when deciding about entering into 
partnership with each other or not. In case the additional costs to be entailed in cooperative 
relationships are higher than that of non-cooperative relationship, the firm’s preferred choice 
would be to opt for no collaboration strategy.  
In collaborative supply chain management, low switching costs are preferable for most 
situations. This is however contrary to Porter’s (1985) proposition that high switching costs are 
necessary for stopping partners from leaving coalition. Since various studies have revealed that 
partnerships that are sustained through coercion, threats or high switching costs fail to give the 
equity of benefits to partners  which are required to ensuring successful collaboration (Kumar & 
Dissel, 1996; Iacovou et al.,1995). 
Keeping in view of the recommendations by Kumar & Dissel (1996) and Iacovou et al. (1995), 
the decisions regarding collaboration mode are based on low switching costs. Therefore, each of 
    ,           ,     costs are compared from the perspective of each partner, and the final 




Other costs such inventory carrying costs, transportation costs and production fixed costs etc. are 
important too but are not the main focus during the decision making process. However after 
entering into collaboration, partners can stress each other to restructure the supply chain 
processes and operation systems so that reductions can be made in the inventory carrying costs 
and other related costs since the costs in partial or full collaboration are to be shared equally by 
the partners.  
After application of ANP method, potential partners are shortlisted and are further scrutinized by 
comparing      ,           ,    . The concept of game theory is applied not only to ascertain 
likely responses of partners but also to determine which mode of collaboration will best suit each 
partner.     ,           ,     costs are of great importance for partners when deciding about 
which collaboration to select.  
In order to help prospective partners make the decision regarding which type of collaboration 
will be beneficial for them, a collaboration decision making model was built using C++ 
language. The complete program is attached in appendix B.  
 
3.3.3.1 Model formulation 
The model can be used for four different types of collaboration scenarios as shown below: 
Different collaboration scenarios: 
 
Scenario 1: 





A group of retailers (      contemplating about collaborating with a single supplier (     ). 
Scenario 3: 
A group of suppliers (      contemplating about collaborating with a single retailer (     ). 
Scenario 4: 
A group of suppliers (      contemplating about collaborating with a group of retailers  
(     ). 
 
Method 
A program in C++ is written which basically takes      ,           ,     as an input from each 
partner and then sums up the four cost components of these costs for each mode of collaboration. 
Finally, it makes recommendations to each partner about which mode of collaboration will be 
best for it. For instance, if full collaboration is expected to be benefiting both the supplier and 
retailer; however the total switching costs for retailer is lower in full collaboration and higher for 
supplier. In this case, supplier would not necessarily opt for full collaboration with the retailer 
since supplier is required to spend more than the retailer in partial collaboration. Negotiations 
can certainly take place between retailer and supplier but supplier’s expected decision would be 
“no”. May be partial collaboration or no collaboration is more beneficial to supplier since it 
entails low switching costs than that in full collaboration. However, if expected benefits for 
supplier in partial collaboration are higher than the other two types of collaboration; in this case, 
the supplier would not care about high switching costs and will enter into partial collaboration 




The user (supplier or retailer) will be prompted to enter the following cost information as shown 
below: 
    = System implementation and integration cost 
    = Operational cost 
    = Partnership instability cost  
   = Switching cost  
 
Process 
After taking the above mentioned costs as inputs, the program will actually sum up four cost 
components for each partner under each collaboration mode and recommend which mode of 
collaboration will best each partner. Mode of collaboration that involves low total switching 
costs will be the preferred choice.  
 
Output  
As mentioned earlier, a partner can have three choices to make i.e. “Partial Collaboration” “Full 
Collaboration” or “No Collaboration”. The decision criteria whether to go for any of the above 
mentioned collaboration categories will solely depend on      ,           ,     costs. The final 






Example Output for scenario 2 
 
Retailer(s)                                                                                      Supplier(s) 
  Partial Collaboration  
.                                                            No Collaboration  
.                                                                 Full Collaboration  
.       Partial Collaboration  
. . 
. . 
      
 
Figure 9: Sample output of the model 
 
The output shows that for retailer X, the best strategy for collaboration would be to form no 
collaboration and partial collaboration with suppliers T and I respectively. Similarly, the best 
strategies for suppliers T and I would be to form partial collaboration and full collaboration with 
retailer X. 
 
3.4 Profit allocation mechanism using Shapely method 
The last step in in the process of partner selection for supply chain collaboration is developing a 
profit allocation mechanism via Shapley method. Profit allocation amongst the prospective 
partners is designed as a cooperative game since a coalition between a supplier and the retailer 
has already been formed and each has its own payoff function. Shapely value is a solution model 
in cooperative game theory. Assuming that a coalition of players collaborates, and attains a 






alliance than others or may have different bargaining power, Shapley value allocates profit 
according to the “adding value” each partner brings for the alliance. This ensures that partners 
are rewarding corresponding to their contribution in the coalition (Ferguson, 1998).  
In our study, it is assumed that in partial collaboration, each partner has complete control over 
pricing decisions. For instance, the payoff payoff function for retailer in partial collaboration 
arrangement with the supplier is represented by  
 
   = (   –   )    – (    +    +   +      ) 
In the equation,   ,        represents the retaile price, wholeslae price and the number of items 
sold to the end customers respectively by the retailer. In partial collaboration, the retailer is free 
to set pricing on its own. However, suppliers expect retailers to set resonable prices since 
suppliers are bound to re-buy the unsold inventory from the retailer. Usually, a supplier sets a 
limit for re-buying the unsold inventory. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the parties to 
charge a resonable price from the end customers. Inventory costs, transportation costs and 
adminsitrative costs are shared between the retailer and the supplier. However,total switching 
costs  are endured separately by the partners in partial collabration.  
Similarly, the payoff function for supplier in partial collaboration arrangement with the retailer is 
represented by  
 
    =   (   –   )    – (    +    +              )   
  ,       denotes the retaile price, cost price and the total number of items sold to the retailer 
respectively.  
In partial collaboration, the supplier is also free to make pricing decisions on its own.  
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However, in case of full collaboration, the partners work like a single entity. The pricing 
decisions are made individually by each partner like in partial collaboration. However, the total 
switching costs are shared equally among the partners. In full collaboration, there is a possibility 
of retailer paying more total switching costs than the supplier or vice versa. This is the essence of 
full collaboration. Full collaboration promotes the culture of trust and commitment. Retailer 
normally gets heavily discounted prices from the supplier. As a result, the retailer will be in a 
better position to sell the goods at a reduced price to end customers, which in turn, would 
increase demand from the customers and ultimately give both retailer and the supplier a 
completive edge from their rivals as a result of selling more goods at an affordable price. This is 
the main reason why most retailers and supplier enter into collaboration. In full collaboration 
supplier is able to reduce its operating costs as a result of better forecasts, reduced demand 
variability and better information for sales & operations planning (S&OP).   
When calculating the final payoff functions for the partners, Shapely value is interpreted in terms 
of expected marginal contribution. Marginal contribution can easily be determined by taking into 
account all the possible orders of the players entering the coalition. The amount a player receives 
through this method is dependent on the order in which the players join the coalition. Shapley 
value is an average payoff to the players provided players are entered in entirely random order 
(Ferguson, 1998). Shapely Value method ensures that partners who contribute more to the 
coalition should be paid more and vice versa. The determination of shapely value is based on 
certain assumptions as follows: 
It is assumed that N is a set of players S ϵ N is a subset of N and V(s) is expressed as the 
characteristic function of the subset. s denotes the income and we set    as profit of i involved in 




∑   
 
    = v (s)         v (s) > ∑         (i) 
 
Based on shapely theory, it can get: 
 
   = ∑    | | 
   
       [v(s) – v (s\ i)] 
  
   | |  =  (n – | | !  | | – 1)!                                                                                    Equation 3.7 
 n! 
  
In the formula above,    | |  is a weighted factor,  | | denotes the size of the subset, i.e. the 
number of participants;     are all subset that entails I in the set of s, v (s\ i) of [v(s) – v (s\ i)] 
represents the income after eliminating i from subset s. so [v(s) – v (s\ i)] can be considered as 
member i contributing to the coalition of s.  
Ferguson (1998) interprets the formula as follows: suppose a random order of players is chosen 
with all n! orders (permutations) of the players equally likely. Next, the players are entered 
according to this order. In case, when player i enter, he creates coalition (which means if the 
player finds s – {i} there already), he obtains the amount  [    –    (  – { })]  
The probability that when i arrives, he will find coalition s – {i} there already is (| | – 1)! (n - 
| |)!/n!. Denominator represents the total number of permutations of the n players in the 
coalition. Numerator denotes the number of these permutations in which the n - | | participants 
of s – {i} come first (| | – 1)! ways, next player i and then the remaining n - | | players ((n- 
| |          As a result,    (v) represents the average amount player I contributes to the overall 
coalition provided players serially form this coalition in a random order (Ferguson, 1998).  
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In this chapter, we present a numerical application of the proposed approach to investigate the 
following research questions: 
1) How supplier profiling can be carried out to build a list of suppliers that conforms to 
certain minimum criteria? 
2) How to solve the multi-criteria partner selection problem for collaboration? How to solve 
relationships among some critical variables? 
3) What choices suppliers and retailers have? What kind of collaboration will best suit a 
particular partner? In other words, under what conditions are suppliers and retailer 
willing to collaborate? 
4) After collaboration, how the profit will be allocated fairly amongst the partners to ensure 
long term collaboration? 
 
4.2 Case illustration 
Taylor Sons (hypothetical organization) has decided to open its new outlet in Montreal. Taylor 
Sons is one of the Quebec’s largest regional retailers in food and beverage industry. It is an 
expensive brand with revenues exceeding $500 million. Some of Taylor’s products include dairy 
products, confectionery, bottled water baby food, pet foods coffee breakfast cereals, and ice 
cream. The Chief Manager of the new outlet has been given the task to search for new 
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appropriate suppliers who can offer quality goods at an affordable price. Supplier selection is a 
daunting task for any firm and it requires intense planning to develop a framework which ensures 
prospective suppliers will be able to conform to their particular set of requirements.   
 
4.3 Problem  
 
The Chief Manager is aware of other retailers’ market positions. His vision for this new outlet is 
to increase its competiveness against both local and foreign competitors operating in food and 
beverage industry in Montreal. The Chief Manager believes that the best way forward in 
accomplishing this goal is to move beyond “arm’s-length” relationships with its prospective 
suppliers to “long-term collaborative” ones. He is fully aware of the advantages which will be 
realized as a result of going into collaboration with its prospective suppliers.  
There are number of local and foreign suppliers available in Montreal region who can cater to the 
needs of the Taylor Sons. During a research by the Chief Manager, 72% of Montreal’s region 
suppliers were willing to enter into collaboration while 28% rejected the idea.  
 
4.4 Proposed approach 
4.4.1 Supplier profiling 
Taylor Sons is provided with a list of 1233 potential suppliers. The list contains important 
information about the potential suppliers such as region, country, market capitalisation and 
industry type. However, to keep things simple, Taylor Sons considers only three factors: industry 
type, market capitalisation and location. For analysis, a screen dump below shows the excel sheet 
containing the list of twenty nine potential suppliers. However, the approach will remain the 
same for profiling 1233 suppliers. 
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Table 10: Data Set of Potential Suppliers 
No. Name of Company 
Industry 
Type 
Market cap. (Year end, 
Millions. USD) Country 
1 JBS S.A 1.30 68840.00 5.00 
2 A123 Systems, Inc. 1.80 17.00 1.00 
3 Aaron's, Inc. 1.60 2290.00 2.00 
4 Nestle 1.30 51861.00 5.00 
5 Pepsico 1.30 59749.00 5.00 
6 Unilever 1.30 3922.00 6.00 
7 Accenture Plc 1.70 45908.00 4.00 
8 Accretive Health, Inc. 1.80 1263.00 2.00 
9 ACE Limited 1.70 28764.00 3.00 
10 Acme Packet, Inc. 1.10 1601.00 4.00 
11 Procter & Gamble 1.30 10952.00 5.00 
12 Activision Blizzard, Inc. 1.30 12584.00 6.00 
13 Adobe Systems Inc. 1.40 19078.00 9.00 
14 ADTRAN Inc. 1.40 1275.00 5.00 
15 Advance Auto Parts Inc. 1.60 5451.00 5.00 
16 
Advanced Micro Devices, 
Inc. 
1.80 1943.00 5.00 
17 Advantage Oil & Gas Ltd. 1.10 535.00 5.00 
18 General Mills 1.30 2732.00 5.00 
19 Kraft 1.30 657.00 8.00 
20 BRF 1.30 1044.00 6.00 
21 Aetna Inc. 1.20 16264.00 9.00 
22 
Affiliated Managers Group 
Inc. 
1.40 7672.00 1.00 
23 Aflac Inc. 1.70 24913.00 2.00 
24 Dole Food Company 1.30 5028.00 5.00 
25 Bunge Limited 1.30 880.00 5.00 
26 Agilent Technologies Inc. 1.20 15413.00 5.00 
27 Sysco Corporation 1.30 4846.00 5.00 
28 Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. 1.20 8463.00 9.00 
29 Grupo Bimbo 1.30 16535.00 5.00 
 
The two tables shown below represent the numeric values assigned to the industry type and 
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Table 12: Numeric value for region 
 
Table 11: Numeric value for industry 
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Table 13: Cluster analysis result 
 
 
Supplier profiling is carried out through process of cluster analysis as shown in table 13. 
NeuroXL, an add-on Microsoft Excel, is used to perform cluster analysis on the spreadsheet. 
No. Name of Company  Industry Type Market cap. (year end, mln. USD) Country Cluster Number
1 Unilever 1.3 3,922 6 1
2 Acme Packet, Inc. 1.1 1,601 4 1
3 Procter & Gamble 1.3 10,952 5 1
4 Activision Blizzard, Inc. 1.3 12,584 6 1
5 Adobe Systems Inc. 1.4 19,078 9 1
6 ADTRAN Inc. 1.4 1,275 5 1
7 Advantage Oil & Gas Ltd. 1.1 535 5 1
8 General Mills 1.3 2,732 5 1
9 Kraft 1.3 657 8 1
10 BRF 1.3 1,044 6 1
11 Aetna Inc. 1.2 16,264 9 1
12 Dole Food Company 1.3 5,028 5 1
13 Bunge Limited 1.3 880 5 1
14 Agilent Technologies Inc. 1.2 15,413 5 1
15 Sysco Corporation 1.3 4,846 5 1
16 Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. 1.2 8,463 9 1
17 Grupo Bimbo 1.3 16,535 5 2
18 JBS S.A 1.3 68,840 5 2
19 Nestle 1.3 51,861 5 2
20 Pepsico 1.3 59,749 5 3
21 A123 Systems, Inc. 1.8 17 1 3
22 Aaron's, Inc. 1.6 2,290 2 3
23 Accenture plc 1.7 45,908 4 3
24 Accretive Health, Inc. 1.8 1,263 2 3
25 ACE Limited 1.7 28,764 3 3
26 Advance Auto Parts Inc. 1.6 5,451 5 3
27 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 1.8 1,943 5 3
28 Affiliated Managers Group Inc. 1.4 7,672 1 3
29 Aflac Inc. 1.7 24,913 2 3
1.271 7165.235 6.00 Cluster 1 average
1.300 60150.000 5.00 Cluster 2 average
1.678 13135.667 2.78 Cluster 3 average
-0.092 -0.506 0.23 Cluster 1 weighted average (%)
-0.071 3.148 0.02 Cluster 2 weighted average (%)
0.198 -0.094 -0.43 Cluster 3 weighted average (%)
1.100 535.000 4.00 Cluster 1 minimum
1.300 51861.000 5.00 Cluster 2 minimum
1.400 17.000 1.00 Cluster 3 minimum
1.400 19078.000 9.00 Cluster 1 maximum
1.300 68840.000 5.00 Cluster 2 maximum
1.800 45908.000 5.00 Cluster 3 maximum
0.59 Cluster 1 weight (%)
0.10 Cluster 2 weight (%)




Figure 10: Cluster Weights 
 
The result of cluster analysis groups the companies into three different categories. The average 
data values for these categories and the weight of each cluster, which denotes the percentage of 
items belonging to the cluster, are shown in figure 10.  A graphical representation of each cluster 
can be created from the data above: 
 
























 Industry Type Market cap. (year end,
mln. USD)
Country
Clusters profiles Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
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From figure 11, we can ascertain the characteristics of each cluster. For instance, cluster 2 
contains companies which belong to food and beverage industry, located in North America and 
have high market capitalization.  
Through implementation of above mentioned steps, supplier profiling can be achieved. Cluster 
analysis does the work of identifying relevant patterns and trends and then clustering the data 
into subsequent categories. As a result of supplier profiling through cluster analysis, JBS S.A, 
Nestle, Pepsico, Unilever, Procter & Gamble, General Mills, Bunge Ltd, Grupo Bimbo, Kraft, 
and Dole Food company have been shortlisted for further screening through ANP method.  
 
4.4.2 Application of Analytical Network Process 
The second step in supplier chain collaboration entails ranking of short listed potential suppliers. 
Since interdependence relationships exist between the factors and their criterion, the analytical 
process network (ANP) analysis method is utilized to deal with this kind of relationship. ANP is 
a multi-criteria decision making method which was presented by Saaty (1996). Through 
bibliography research, partner selection factors and their criterion, are identified as demonstrated 
in chapter 3. 
In order to structure the decision problem, we first defined the goal, factors, criterion for each 
factor, and the alternatives. Next, the relations between alternatives, factors and their respective 
criterions were established. As a result, the network of the problem is built on super decisions 




Figure 12: Network model 
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As can be seen in the network model, ANP method allows dependence relations amongst 
elements and clusters. Such relations are denoted by arrows, when the dependence occurs 
between clusters over another cluster. Similarly when there is dependence between elements of 
the same cluster, it is represented by a loop. In case of an arrow from a cluster to another, it’s 
enough that at least one element of the original cluster is associated to an element of the 
destination cluster (Saaty, 2005). This way, with possibility to examine dependences among 
criteria and influence among alternatives, ANP method is applied with the help of Super 
Decisions software.  
 
Stage 2: Judgments 
After structuring of the decision problem along with the identification of the interactions 
between and within clusters and elements (detailed interactions relationship is explained in 
chapter 3), the judgment stage begins. In judgment stage, the decision makers express their 
preferences through creation of the comparison matrices of clusters, elements and ratings, based 
on Saaty’s fundamental scale. The Saaty’s fundamental scale is shown below: 
 
Table 14: Scale of Relative Importance 
Intensity of Importance Definition 
1 Equal Importance 
3 Moderate Importance 
5 Strong Importance 
7 Very Strong or Demonstrated Importance 
9 Extreme Importance 
2,4,6,8 




The comparisons are then made in which an element of a cluster has link of dependency with at 
least two elements of another cluster. In this way, pairwise comparisons for the elements in each 
cluster that belong to a parent node are carried out for all the parent nodes in the model. On super 
decision software, there are several ways to do comparisons: graphic, questionnaire, verbal, 
matrix. Figure 13 demonstrates an example of pairwise comparison matrix among the elements 
of the Cluster “compatibility” with respect to element “collaboration possibility”. It is apparent 
that the location has higher influence with a priority of 0.427; followed by cost, with priority 
0.23. 
Figure 13: Pairwise comparison matrix between elements of the cluster “Compatibility” 
with respect to element “Collaboration Possibility” 
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Procter & Gamble 0.018 0.099
General Mills 0.015 0.084
JBS S.A 0.014 0.073
Dole Foods 0.014 0.780
Bunge Ltd 0.116 0.063
Kraft 0.009 0.050
Grupo Bimbo 0.008 0.046
Financial Position 0.094 0.705
Forecasting Capabilities 0.010 0.076
Production Facilities & Capacity 0.021 0.157
Reciprocal Arrangements 0.003 0.025
Surge Capacity 0.005 0.004
Costs 0.081 0.371
EDI Capability 0.005 0.022
Information Sharing & Trust 0.016 0.071
Location 0.059 0.270
Management Attitude 0.018 0.086
Strategic Objectives 0.038 0.176
Communication System 0.020 0.293
Current Technology  (Product & Process) 0.028 0.424
Supply Chain Systems 0.019 0.281
Collaboration Possibility 0.031 0.481
Long Term Orientation 0.033 0.518
Delivery 0.008 0.167
Development Speed 0.008 0.165
Lead Times 0.009 0.192
Quality Performance 0.023 0.475
Clause for Arbitration & Escape 0.011 0.207
Willingness to Share Risk 0.041 0.792
Ability to Modify Product/Service 0.007 0.028
After Sales Service (Warranties & Claim Policies)0.009 0.038
Flexibility (payment,freight, price reduction 0.026 0.111











The local priorities associated with these judgments are shown in table 15. The results of all the 
pairwise comparisons are inserted in the un-weighted super matrix. The value contained in the 
cluster matrix are then used to weight the un-weighted super matrix by multiplying the value in 
(Alternatives, Alternatives) cell of the cluster matrix times the value in each cell in the 
(Alternatives, Alternatives) part of the un-weighted super matrix to generate the weighted super 
matrix. Therefore, every part is weighted with its corresponding cluster matrix in this fashion.  
Next, the eigenvectors are obtained from the pairwise comparisons of clusters (Clusters Weight 
matrix). Table 16 below represents the eigenvectors. 
Table 16: Eigenvectors Matrix 
 
From table 16, it is possible to identify how much clusters are influenced by another cluster. For 
example, cluster “capability” influences the clusters “compatibility (0.13), IT (0.2), long term 
relationship (0.11), performance (0.17), risk management (0.25) and service (0.14). In addition, 
if there exists an inner dependence (loop) between a cluster such as in clusters “performance”, 
“compatability”, “capability”, “IT” and “long term relationship”; this indicates how much each 
cluster gets influenced by itself. For instance, clusters “performance”, “compatability”, “IT”, 
“capability” and “long term relationship” suffer an influence of themsleves by (0.17), (0.13), 
(0.20), (0.17) and (0.11) respectively. From the table 16, it can be seen that cluster “service” is 
only influlenced by clusters “compatability” and “long term relationship”. However, cluster 




Service To select top 
suppliers 
Alternatives 0.00 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.00
Capability 0.00 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.14
Compatability 0.00 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.14
IT 0.00 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.14
Long Term 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14
Performance 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.14
Risk Management 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
Service 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
To select top suppliers 0.00 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.00
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“service” influences all clusters except itself and cluster “risk management”. The cluster that 
have the higher importance is “compatability”  based on the weight vectors for the clusters 
capability, IT, long term, risk management. 
 
Algebraic Development  
After the pairwise comparisons, the next step is to determine super matrixes. The un-weighted, 
weighted and limit matrixes can be found in the CD attached to the thesis.  
The unweighted supermatrix is constituted by priority vectors placed in columns, gained as a 
result of pairwise comparisons. For example, the vector of priority gained in table 15 might be 
seen in the last column of supermatrix. In each column, the number of prioroities denotes the 
number of comparisons of the element corresponding to that column.  
The weighted supermatrix is worked out by multiplying the weights of the clusters by its 
corresponding blocks of the unweighted supermatrix. As a result, a stochastic matrix is achieved 
in which sum of every column is 1. Zeroes in the matrix signify the absence of interaction. 
Limit matrix is obtained by increasing the weigted supermatirx to successive powers until its 
merged together. All priorities are stable. It can be observed that the non-zero values , found in 







The final ranking of the suppliers is presented in table 17. In the example, the supplier that 
presents a higher ratio of the ranking is the Nestle, followed by suppliers Pepsico, Unilever, 
Procter & Gamble, General Mills, Dole Foods, JBS S.A, Bunge Ltd, Kraft and Grupo Bimbo. 
In Table 15, priorities of element normalized by cluster and priorities from limiting matrix is 
shown. Values of “priorities from limiting matrix” column originate from the limit matrix. This 
basically presents global priority with respect to the integer model, adding 1. These values which 
are normalized by cluster origin the column “priorities normalized by cluster”, in a way that the 
priorities of each cluster give 1. 
The elements “financial position”, “cost”, “location”, and “collaboration possibility” represent 
the higher priorities in the clusters capability, compatibility, compatibility and long term 
relationship. 
In the cluster “capability”, the financial position and production facilities & capacity of the 
supplier is of utmost importance. Financial stability of the supplier is one of the pre-requisites for 
long term collaboration since collaboration requires partners to invest in updating systems, share 
risks and resources. The supplier should have an adequate production facilities and capacity 
which can allow it to cater to the unexpected demands of the retailer.  
In the cluster “capability”; cost, location and strategic objectives of the supplier are important. 
The retailer expects the supplier to offer them products/goods at an affordable price. Location is 
also another important aspect. Most retailers prefer suppliers to be located close to their facilities 
so that their demands can be met in timely fashion.  In case if a supplier is far from the retailer, it 
will incur additional shipment costs. Strategic objectives of the supplier is critical because the 
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suppliers’ strategic objectives should align with the retailers’ ones. There should be some form 
of commonality between the partners’ strategic objectives.  
In “IT” cluster; current technology has a high priority. The supplier must have an updated 
technological systems and processes in place which can cater to the needs of the collaboration 
with the retailer.  
In “long term relationship” cluster; both collaboration possibility and long term orientation have 
same importance. It is important for supplier to commit to collaboration with the retailer.  
With regards to “performance” cluster, delivery, quality and lead times are important. The 
retailer expects the supplier to be able to develop and supply a quality product at the right time.  
In “risk management” cluster; willingness to share risk has high priority. In collaboration, the 
retailer expects its partner to fully share the risk.  
In cluster “service”; flexibility and ability to modify service/good have higher priorities. The 
supplier should be able to meet the variation in demand of the retailer and should also be flexible 
in terms of payments. In case of a change in customer needs, the retailer expects the supplier to 
be capable of modifying the product/good with ease.  
 
ANP results   







Table 17: The Synthesized Values – the Results for the Alternatives 
 
As shown in table 17, the “raw” columns denotes the priorities from limiting super matrix, 
“normals” column represents the results normalized for each component and the column “ideals” 
present the results gained as a result of dividing the values in either the normalized or limiting 
columns by the largest value in the column. The number one ranked supplier is supplier Nestle. 
The top 4 suppliers selected for further screening through game theory includes Nestle, Pepsico, 
Unilever and Procter & Gamble. 
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4.4.3 Collaboration model 
ANP method helped select four potential suppliers for collaboration. However, it is not yet clear 
which form of collaboration i.e. “full collaboration”, “partial collaboration” or “no collaboration” 
will best suit the retailer. But, it is not guaranteed that the retailer’s decision will be acceptable to 
the supplier. For example, based on the payoff functions, it might be in the best interest of 
retailer to go for full collaboration with a particular supplier whereas full collaboration option 
might not profitable for that particular supplier. In order to address this issue, Nash equilibrium 
analysis is carried out. The collaboration model is built on C++ and it incorporates the concept of 
Nash equilibrium. The collaboration model can be utilized for different collaboration scenarios 
as shown below: 
 
Different collaboration scenarios 
Scenario 1: 
Single Supplier (      collaborates with a Single Retailer (     . 
Scenario 2: 
A group of retailers (      contemplating about collaborating with a single supplier (     ) 
Scenario 3: 
A group of suppliers (      contemplating about collaborating with a single retailer (     ) 
Scenario 4: 
A group of suppliers (      contemplating about collaborating with a group of retailers  
(     ) 
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This illustrative example is of scenario 3 type. The program in C++ basically takes     ,           
,     as an input both from each partner and then sums up these costs. Finally, it makes 
recommendations to each partner about which type of collaboration will be best for it. The C++ 
program is built upon the foundation of Nash Equilibrium. 
 
Input  
Four cost components for each partner under each collaboration mode are used as the input for 
the model.  
Table 18: Model input 
 
 
In table 18, retailer 1 (R1) represent “Taylor Sons” and suppliers S1, S2, S3 and S4 represent 
Nestle, Unilever, Procter & Gamble and Grupo Bimbo respectively. 
 
R1-S1 R1-S1 Total S1-R1 S1-R1 Total
F.C 400 400 100 200 F.C 1 1100 F.C 460 110 200 100 F.C 1 870
P.C 300 250 200 100 P.C 1 850 P.C 220 200 110 100 P.C 1 630
N.C 0 0 400 550 N.C 1 950 N.C 0 0 340 200 N.C 1 540
R1-S2 R1-S2 Total S2-R1 S2-R1 Total
F.C 500 400 400 200 F.C 1 1500 F.C 600 200 200 200 F.C 1 1200
P.C 550 200 600 260 P.C 1 1610 P.C 600 200 300 150 P.C 1 1250
N.C 0 0 1100 600 N.C 1 1700 N.C 0 0 700 650 N.C 1 1350
R 1-S3 R1-S3 Total S3-R1 S3-R1 Total
F.C 500 103 250 250 F.C 1 1103 F.C 700 100 100 100 F.C 1 1000
P.C 300 200 250 124 P.C 1 874 P.C 400 100 140 100 P.C 1 740
N.C 0 0 300 150 N.C 1 450 N.C 0 0 790 200 N.C 1 990
R1-S4 R2-S4 Total S4-R1 S4-R1 Total
F.C 300 100 150 300 F.C 1 850 F.C 500 100 220 100 F.C 1 920
P.C 200 150 100 90 P.C 1 540 P.C 300 100 200 100 P.C 1 700




A program is written in C++ to perform Nash equilibrium analysis for multiple numbers of 
retailers and/or supplier. In the example, only one retailer and 4 suppliers are considered. A 
complete program is provided in appendix A.  
 
Table 19: Expected Output 
 
* Collaboration mode involving minimum payoff (lowest total switching costs) is recommended to each partner.  
 
Since the example is considering only 4 suppliers and one retailer, it is possible to sum and 
compare the total costs. The likely costs to be incurred by the retailer and the suppliers as a result 
of going into collaboration are shown in the table 19. For instance, R1-S1 means costs to be 
incurred by the retailer as a result of going into collaboration with supplier 1. F.C, P.C, and N.C 
R1-S1 R1-S1 Total S1-R1 S1-R1 Total
F.C 400 400 100 200 F.C 1 1100 F.C 460 110 200 100 F.C 1 870
P.C 300 250 200 100 P.C 1 850 P.C 220 200 110 100 P.C 1 630
N.C 0 0 400 550 N.C 1 950 N.C 0 0 340 200 N.C 1 540
R1-S2 R1-S2 Total S2-R1 S2-R1 Total
F.C 500 400 400 200 F.C 1 1500 F.C 600 200 200 200 F.C 1 1200
P.C 550 200 600 260 P.C 1 1610 P.C 600 200 300 150 P.C 1 1250
N.C 0 0 1100 600 N.C 1 1700 N.C 0 0 700 650 N.C 1 1350
R 1-S3 R1-S3 Total S3-R1 S3-R1 Total
F.C 500 103 250 250 F.C 1 1103 F.C 700 100 100 100 F.C 1 1000
P.C 300 200 250 124 P.C 1 874 P.C 400 100 140 100 P.C 1 740
N.C 0 0 300 150 N.C 1 450 N.C 0 0 790 200 N.C 1 990
R1-S4 R2-S4 Total S4-R1 S4-R1 Total
F.C 300 100 150 300 F.C 1 850 F.C 500 100 220 100 F.C 1 920
P.C 200 150 100 90 P.C 1 540 P.C 300 100 200 100 P.C 1 700
N.C 0 0 250 100 N.C 1 350 N.C 0 0 350 400 N.C 1 750
Expected Output Expected Output
R1 should  do Partial Collaboration with S1 S1 should do No Collaboration with R1
*R1 should do Full collaboration with S2 *S2 should do Full Collaboration with R1
R1 should do No Collaboration with S3 S3 should do Partial Collaboration with R1
R1 should do No Collaboration with S4 S4 should do Partial Collaboration with R1
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denotes the costs to be entailed by the retailer as a result of collaboration with supplier 1. In this 
case, R1 should go into “partial collaboration with supplier 1 since the total switching costs (16) 
is lowest in this mode.   
Similarly, S1-R1 means the costs to be endured by supplier 1 as a consequence of going into 
collaboration with retailer 1. The costs for different collaboration modes are shown in the table 
19. In this case, supplier 1 should go into “no collaboration” with retailer. This signifies that it 
might be profitable for retailer 1 to go into partial collaboration with supplier 1 but supplier 1 
will be better off by accepting “no collaboration” option. Therefore, Nash equilibrium is not 
achieved in this case.  
However with regards to R1-S2 and S2-R1, we can see that it is indeed “Nash equilibrium”. The 
Nash equilibrium solution is highlighted black in table 19.  Based on the payoff functions, it is 
recommended that R1 should engage in full collaboration with supplier 2. On the other hand, it is 
also beneficial for supplier 2 to enter into full collaboration with retailer 1. This is the Nash 
equilibrium because supplier 2 is making the best decision it can, taking into consideration 
retailer 1 decision, and retailer 1 is taking the best decision it can, taking into account supplier’s 
2 decision. Collaboration mode involving lowest payoff denotes that total switching costs 
required for entering into a particular collaboration mode by the partner will be less. Since, it’s 
already been assumed that collaboration, be it partial or full, will ultimately result in net benefits 
for a particular partner. Hence, collaboration mode entailing lowest total switching costs will be 







The input costs are inserted into a text file. The Microsoft Visual studio incorporates the text file. 
In order to verify and validate the model, input costs as shown in table 18 are included in the text 
file. The program is run and it gave the following output: 
 
Figure 14: Output from the Model 
 
The output is exactly the same as shown in table 19. In table 19, the results are calculated 
manually. However, when the program is run, it exactly gives the same results. Finally, supplier 
2 i.e. Unilever is selected by the retailer and both intend to enter into full collaboration with each 
other.  
 
4.4.4 Profit allocation: Shapely value 
Next step involves working out a profit allocation mechanism via Shapely value for the partners.   




      
∑   | |                | |  
  
      –       – { }       
The summation as shown in the formula above is basically the summation over all coalitions s 
that include i.        –       – { }   is an amount by which the value of coalition s – {i} rises 
whenever player i joins the coalition game. Therefore, in order to determine,    (v), we need to 
list all coalitions that contain I, determine the value of player I’s contribution to that coalition, 
multiply this by (| | – 1)! (n - | |)!/n! and finally, derive the sum. (T. Ferguson, 1998).  
The payoff functions were determined in chapter 3. In our fictitious example, partial 
collaboration has been recommended to both the supplier and the retailer. The payoff functions 
for partial collaboration for supplier and retailer are shown below:   
The payoff function PF for supplier in a full collaboration arrangement with the retailer is given 
by  
   =  (   –   )     – {     +    +        ) +      /2} 
 
The payoff function PF for retailer in partial collaboration arrangement with the supplier is given 
by  
 
    =  (   –   )     – {     +    +        ) +      /2}  
 
The costs related to inventory, administration, transportation, total switching costs, in case of 
partial or full collaboration, and  production fixed costs are estimated for each partner. Costs for 





Table 20: Cost Components 
 
 
As a result, now we have c ({1}) = 1850, c ({2}) = 1785 and c ({1, 2}) = 3245. Now, there can 
be two possible orders of arrivals: (1) first retailer then supplier, and (2) first supplier and then 
retailer. 
In case retailer comes before supplier, retailer’s contribution is c ({1}) = 1850; when supplier 
comes the surplus increases from 1850 to c ({1, 2}) = 3245 and as a result, supplier’s marginal 
contribution is c ({1, 2}) – c ({1}) = 3245 – 1850=1395. 
In case supplier arrives first before retailer, supplier’s contribution is c ({2}) =1785; when 
retailer comes, the surplus increases from 1785 to c ({1, 2}) = 3245 and as a result, supplier’s 
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As a result, a table can be derived as shown below: 




















 Figure 15: Marginal Contribution of Players 
 
Therefore, retailer’s expected marginal contribution is  
 
 
 x 1850 +  
 
 
  x 1460 =1655 and 
supplier’s expected marginal contribution is 
 
 
 x 1395 + 
 
 
 x 1785 = 1590. 
Therefore the Shapely values are    =1655 and    = 1590. 
The Shapely Values denote that retailer (Taylor Sons) and the supplier (Unilever) need to pay 
1665 and 1590 respectively in order to enter into full collaboration with each other. 





Chapter 5:                                                                                                             
Conclusions & Future Work 
6.1 Conclusions  
Current economic downturn, intense global competition and fast changing customer demands, 
have made it difficult for organizations to stay competitive in the current market place. 
Recession affected customers are constantly looking for better quality and innovative products at 
a relatively low price. In the nutshell, organizations which are capable of selling products or 
services which satisfy the above mentioned specifications will be able to dominate the market. In 
response to this challenge, the concept of supply chain collaboration has emerged as a new 
approach to attaining competitive advantage through cost reduction, increased asset utilization, 
and reduced inventories. Collaboration has been seen as important factor for achieving effective 
and efficient supply chain management. By forming collaboration, firms can help each other to 
share risks and exploit each other’s complementary resources (Park et al 2004). In addition to 
this, effective long term collaboration can help firms to eliminate excess inventories, increase 
sales, reduce lead times and improve customer service levels (Anderson & Lee, 1999).   
Although, the concept of collaboration has been researched extensively in a wide range of 
different contexts, apparently few published academic articles and journal papers in supply chain 
literature have focused on identifying the important steps involved in managing the supply chain 
collaboration process from its conception through planning and implementation to successful 
execution. However, this study put into application a combination of different techniques such as 
cluster analysis, analytical network process and game theory at once and provides a 
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comprehensive analysis on the role each of these technique plays and examines all the necessary 
steps involved in the process of partner selection for supply chain collaboration. 
While supply chain collaboration amongst firms can often provide them with competitive 
advantage, however, lack of understanding regarding the presence of barriers of collaboration 
might hamper the advantages of collaboration (Ramesh et al., 2010). A number of factors such as 
the level of trust between collaborating partners (Delbufalo, 2012), willingness to share 
information (Barratt, 2004), mistrust regarding the fairness of benefit, costs and risk sharing 
(Cruijssen, 2012; Rossi, 2012) and availability of adequate and measurement systems to support 
the efficiency and flexibility requirements of the supply chain (Reddy, 2001a; Karahannas & 
Jones,1999) can influence the level of benefits that can be realized as a result of collaboration. 
Therefore, firms must first fully understand the barriers and take appropriate actions to ensure 
true essence of collaboration is being conformed. Trust is the key factor. The need for trust to 
exist between partners has been recognized as a vital aspect of collaboration. Information 
sharing, adequate information technology capabilities and measurements systems are also vital 
factors that must be considered for ensuring long term collaboration. Collaboration between 
partners can only happen when all partners can profit from it in one way or the other and 
provided no partner has anything to gain by changing their own strategy unilaterally.  
 
6.2 SWOT analysis  
In order to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses/limitations, opportunities and threats for this 






1. Provides comprehensive framework for new firms considering collaboration. 
2. Shapely Value method ensures profits are allocated to partners corresponding to their 
contribution in the coalition.  
3. Pre-qualification criteria not only consider partner’s financial contribution to the alliance 
but also take into consideration other important factors such as top management attitude, 
organizational culture, technical capabilities and long term orientation.  
4. The framework in this study for facilitating collaboration between multiple retailers 
and/or suppliers can be easily tailored and applied to problems in a variety of areas and 
industries.   
5. The collaboration model presented in the study is based on a win-win strategy to ensure 
that all partners can benefit from it in one way or the other.  
6. Nash equilibrium analysis provides a basis for determining the realistic behavior of the 
partners under different scenarios.  
7. Views partner selection for collaboration as a multi-criteria decision making process and 
includes set of concepts, methods and techniques that aim to facilitate individuals or 
groups to make decisions that involve various criteria and multiple agents. 
 
Weaknesses/Limitations 
1. Through bibliography research, the partner selection factors are chosen mainly from 
retailers’ and suppliers’ perspective.  
2. The collaboration model takes only total switching costs into account before suggesting 
the best course of action to prospective partners. The input costs used for the 
collaboration model are fictional numbers and do not represent real data. 
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3. In the numerical example, profit allocation via Shapely Value is carried out only for one 
retailer and four suppliers. However, the method will remain the same for multiple 
suppliers and/or retailers. Better demonstration could have been provided had there been 
multiple supplier and/or retailers.  
 
Opportunities  
1. The collaboration model can be further developed to include expected benefits to be 
realized as a result of collaboration. The expected benefits and total switching costs can 
be used to calculate the net benefits for each of the three types of collaboration.  
2. A profit allocation mechanism incorporating the concept of Shapley Value can be 
modeled on a software program which can quickly work out the Shapely values for 
multiple partners in a coalition. 
3. The approach suggested in the study can be integrated with collaborative planning, 
forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) approach, which in turn, can be a useful guide for 
all the stages involved in managing the entire lifecycle of a supply chain collaboration 
process from its conception through planning and implementation, to successful 
execution and disposal.  
 
Threats  
1. In case the total switching costs are not calculated or documented accurately, the model 
would fail to find correct Nash Equilibrium solution, which in turn, can result in partners’ 
not collaborating when in fact they should be.  
2. The partners’ can deliberately inflate the switching costs and other relevant costs such as 
inventory holding costs, transportation, administration and production fixed costs so as to 
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get the maximum profit out of the coalition. The profit allocation mechanism developed 
through Shapely value assumes that partners are being honest and the costs truly reflect 
their contribution in the coalition.  
 
6.3 Future work 
In future, the framework suggested in the study can be further developed by integrating 
collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) method. Shapley Value method 
can be modeled on a software program so that shapely values can be easily estimated for 
multiple partners in a particular coalition. A detailed mechanism regarding estimation of 
components of the total switching costs such as system implementation and integration 
costs,   , operational costs,     : partnership instability costs and    , switching costs for each 
partner can be developed. Currently, the total switching costs are assumed to be in numbers. In 
reality, these numbers represent the additional amount a particular partner has to spend in order 
to update its systems and processes to be compatible for collaboration. However, these costs can 
be considered as non-integers in the form of “high”, “medium”, or “low”. The collaboration 
model can be further developed to incorporate expected net benefits such as cycle time 
reductions, service level gains, inventory and product cost reductions to be realized as a result of 
going into any of the three types of collaboration. The expected benefits can then be compared 
with the total switching costs for calculating the net benefits for each of the three types of 
collaboration. The framework proposed in the study is from retailer and supplier industry’s point 
of view. Through bibliography research, more partner selection factors such as safety, packaging, 
aesthetics, maintenance and reliability can be added so as to allow the framework to be applied 
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 decision = -1; 
 static int count = 0; 
 count++; 
 suppN = count; 
 
 /* 
 sxxp = 0; 
 oxxp = 0; 
 pxxp = 0; 
 txxp = 0; 
 
 sxxf=  0; 
 oxxf = 0; 
 pxxf = 0; 





 int TFC = 0, TPC = 0, TNC = 0; 
 int * minimum; 
 minimum = new int[rets.size()]; 
 
 int * kind; 
 kind = new int[rets.size()]; 
 
 int *a; 
 a = new int[4]; 
  
 int *b; 




 int *c; 
 c = new int[4]; 
 
 int retNumber = -1; 
 int finalminimum = -1; 
 int kindofcol = -1; 
 if (rets.size() != 0) 
 { 
  for(int i = 0; i < rets.size(); i++){ 
   TFC = 0; 
   TPC = 0; 
   TNC = 0; 
   a = rets[i].getDataFC(); 
   b = rets[i].getDataPC(); 
   c = rets[i].getDataNC(); 
   for( int j = 0; j < 4; j++){ 
    TFC += a[j]; 
    TPC += b[j]; 
    TNC += c[j]; 
   } 
    
   //cout << TFC << "   " << TPC << "    "<< TNC << endl; 
   if(TFC < TPC && TFC < TNC){ 
    cout << "Supplier # " << suppN << " should do full 
collaboration with retailer # " << i+1 << endl << endl; 
    minimum[i] =  TFC; 
    kind[i] = 0; 
   } 
   else if(TPC < TNC && TPC < TFC){ 
    cout << "Supplier # " << suppN << " should do partial 
collaboration with retailer # " << i+1<< endl << endl; 
    minimum[i] =  TPC; 
    kind[i] = 1; 
   } 
   else{ 
    cout << "Supplier # " << suppN << " should do no collaboration 
with retailer # " << i+1 << endl << endl; 
    minimum[i] =  TNC; 
    kind[i] = 2; 
   } 
  } 
  /* 
  finalminimum = minimum[0]; 
  kindofcol = kind[0]; 
  retNumber = 1; 
 
  for (int m = 0; m < rets.size(); m++){ 
    
   cout << "minimum array gives: " << minimum[m] << endl; 
   cout << "kind is: " << kind[m]  << endl; 
   if(finalminimum > minimum[m]){ 
     finalminimum = minimum[m]; 
     kindofcol = kind[m]; 
     retNumber = m+1; 
   } 
  } 






 if(kindofcol == 0) 
  cout << "Supplier # " << suppN << "should do full collaboration with 
retailer # " << retNumber << endl; 
 else if(kindofcol == 1) 
  cout << "Supplier # " << suppN << "should do partial collaboration with 
retailer # " << retNumber << endl; 
 else if(kindofcol == 2) 
  cout << "Supplier # " << suppN << "should do no collaboration with retailer 
# " << retNumber << endl; 
 else 
  cout << "Supplier # " << suppN << "should do neither" << endl; 
 */ 





 int TFC = 0, TPC = 0, TNC = 0; 
 int * minimum; 
 minimum = new int[supps.size()]; 
 
 int * kind; 
 kind = new int[supps.size()]; 
 
 int *a; 
 a = new int[4]; 
  
 int *b; 
 b = new int[4]; 
  
 int *c; 
 c = new int[4]; 
 
 int suppNumber = -1; 
 int finalminimum = -1; 
 int kindofcol = -1; 
 if (supps.size() != 0) 
 { 
  for(int i = 0; i < supps.size(); i++){ 
   a = supps[i].getDataFC(); 
   b = supps[i].getDataPC(); 
   c = supps[i].getDataNC(); 
   TFC = 0; 
   TPC = 0; 
   TNC = 0; 
   for( int j = 0; j < 4; j++){ 
    TFC += a[j]; 
    TPC += b[j]; 
    TNC += c[j]; 
   } 
   //cout << TFC << "   " << TPC << "    "<< TNC << endl; 
   if(TFC < TPC && TFC < TNC){ 
    cout << "Retailer # " << retN << " should do full 
collaboration with supplier # " << i+1 << endl << endl; 
    minimum[i] =  TFC; 
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    kind[i] = 0; 
   } 
   else if(TPC < TNC && TPC < TFC){ 
    cout << "Retailer # " << retN << " should do partial 
collaboration with supplier # " << i+1 << endl << endl; 
    minimum[i] =  TPC; 
    kind[i] = 1; 
   } 
   else{ 
    cout << "Retailer # " << retN << " should do no collaboration 
with supplier # " << i+1 << endl << endl; 
    minimum[i] =  TNC; 
    kind[i] = 2; 
   } 
  } 
  /* 
  finalminimum = minimum[0]; 
  kindofcol = kind[0]; 
  suppNumber = 1; 
  for (int m = 0; m < supps.size(); m++){ 
   //cout << "minimum array gives: " << minimum[m] << endl; 
   //cout << "kind is: " << kind[m]  << endl; 
 
   if(finalminimum > minimum[m]){ 
     finalminimum = minimum[m]; 
     kindofcol = kind[m]; 
     suppNumber = m+1; 
   } 
  } 
  */ 
 } 
 /* 
 if(kindofcol == 0) 
  cout << "Retailer # " << retN << "should do full collaboration with 
supplier # " << suppNumber << endl; 
 else if(kindofcol == 1) 
  cout << "Retailer # " << retN << "should do partial collaboration with 
supplier # " << suppNumber << endl; 
 else if(kindofcol == 2) 
  cout << "Retailer # " << retN << "should do no collaboration with supplier 
# " << suppNumber << endl; 
 else 
  cout << "Retailer # " << retN << "should do neither" << endl; 
 */ 





 decision = -1; 
 static int count = 0; 
 count++; 





void retailer::setDataFC(int sf, int of, int pf, int tf){ 
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 FC = new int[4]; 
  
 FC[0] = sf; 
 FC[1] = of; 
 FC[2] = pf; 
 FC[3] = tf; 
} 
void retailer::setDataPC(int sf, int of, int pf, int tf){ 
 PC = new int[4]; 
  
 PC[0] = sf; 
 PC[1] = of; 
 PC[2] = pf; 
 PC[3] = tf; 
}void retailer::setDataNC(int sf, int of, int pf, int tf){ 
 NC = new int[4]; 
  
 NC[0] = sf; 
 NC[1] = of; 
 NC[2] = pf; 
 NC[3] = tf; 
} 
 
void supplier::setDataFC(int sf, int of, int pf, int tf){ 
 FC = new int[4]; 
  
 FC[0] = sf; 
 FC[1] = of; 
 FC[2] = pf; 
 FC[3] = tf; 
} 
void supplier::setDataPC(int sf, int of, int pf, int tf){ 
 PC = new int[4]; 
  
 PC[0] = sf; 
 PC[1] = of; 
 PC[2] = pf; 
 PC[3] = tf; 
}void supplier::setDataNC(int sf, int of, int pf, int tf){ 
 NC = new int[4]; 
  
 NC[0] = sf; 
 NC[1] = of; 
 NC[2] = pf; 




 return FC; 
} 
int *supplier::getDataPC(){ 
 return PC; 
} 
int *supplier::getDataNC(){ 






 return FC; 
} 
int *retailer::getDataPC(){ 
 return PC; 
} 
int *retailer::getDataNC(){ 
 return NC; 
} 
/* 
void supplier::setData(int sf, int of, int pf, int tf,  int sp,int op,int pp ,int tp){ 
 sxxp = sp; 
 oxxp = op; 
 pxxp = pp; 
 txxp = tp; 
 
 sxxf=  sf; 
 oxxf = of; 
 pxxf = pf; 







 supplier s1; 
 supplier s2; 
 supplier s3; 
 supplier s4; 
 //vector <retailer> ret; 








  vector<int> v; 
while (getline(infile, line)) 
{ 
  istringstream iss(line); 
  int n; 
 
 
  while (iss >> n) 
  { 
    v.push_back(n); 
  } 
 
  // do something useful with v 
} 
int c = 0; 
for(int i = 0; i < 3;i++){ 
 if(i==0){ 
  s1.setDataFC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[4*c + 1],v[4*c + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else if(i==1){ 
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  s1.setDataPC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else 
  s1.setDataNC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 









for(int i = 0; i < 3;i++){ 
 if(i==0){ 
  s2.setDataFC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[4*c + 1],v[4*c + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else if(i==1){ 
  s2.setDataPC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else 
  s2.setDataNC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 








for(int i = 0; i < 3;i++){ 
 if(i==0){ 
  s3.setDataFC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[4*c + 1],v[4*c + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else if(i==1){ 
  s3.setDataPC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else 
  s3.setDataNC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 






for(int i = 0; i < 3;i++){ 
 if(i==0){ 
  s4.setDataFC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[4*c + 1],v[4*c + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else if(i==1){ 
  s4.setDataPC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else 
  s4.setDataNC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 








 int a2 = r1.decide(); 
 
 while(rets.size()!=0){ 
   for(int i = 0; i < rets.size(); i++){ 
       rets.erase(rets.begin() + i); 
   } 
 } 
 while(supps.size()!=0){ 
   for(int j = 0; j < supps.size(); j++){ 
       supps.erase(supps.begin() + j); 
   } 
 } 
  
for(int i = 0; i < 3;i++){ 
 if(i==0){ 
  r1.setDataFC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[4*c + 1],v[4*c + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else if(i==1){ 
  r1.setDataPC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else 
  r1.setDataNC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 







 int a4 = s1.decide(); 
 
 while(rets.size()!=0){ 
   for(int i = 0; i < rets.size(); i++){ 
       rets.erase(rets.begin() + i); 
   } 
 } 
 
for(int i = 0; i < 3;i++){ 
 if(i==0){ 
  r1.setDataFC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[4*c + 1],v[4*c + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else if(i==1){ 
  r1.setDataPC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else 
  r1.setDataNC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 






 int a5 = s2.decide(); 
 
 while(rets.size()!=0){ 
   for(int i = 0; i < rets.size(); i++){ 
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       rets.erase(rets.begin() + i); 
   } 
 } 
    
 for(int i = 0; i < 3;i++){ 
 if(i==0){ 
  r1.setDataFC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[4*c + 1],v[4*c + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else if(i==1){ 
  r1.setDataPC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else 
  r1.setDataNC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 






 int a6 = s3.decide(); 
 
 while(rets.size()!=0){ 
   for(int i = 0; i < rets.size(); i++){ 
       rets.erase(rets.begin() + i); 
   } 
 } 
for(int i = 0; i < 3;i++){ 
 if(i==0){ 
  s2.setDataFC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[4*c + 1],v[4*c + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else if(i==1){ 
  s2.setDataPC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 
 } 
 else 
  s2.setDataNC(v[4*c + 0] ,v[(4*c) + 1],v[(4*c) + 2],v[4*c + 3]); 


























 int decision; 
 int suppN; 
 int * FC; 
 int * PC; 
 int * NC; 
/* 
 int sxxp; 
 int oxxp; 
 int pxxp; 
 int txxp; 
 
 int sxxf; 
 int oxxf; 
 int pxxf; 




 int decide(); 
 /* 
 int getsxxp(); 
 int getoxxp(); 
 int getpxxp(); 
 int gettxxp(); 
 
 int getsxxf(); 
 int getoxxf(); 
 int getpxxf(); 
 int gettxxf(); 
 */ 
 int *getDataFC(); 
 int *getDataPC(); 
 int *getDataNC(); 
 
 void setDataFC(int, int, int, int); 
 void setDataPC(int, int, int, int); 
 void setDataNC(int, int, int, int); 






 int sxxp; 
 int oxxp; 
 int pxxp; 
 int txxp; 
 
 int sxxf; 
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 int oxxf; 
 int pxxf; 
 int txxf; 
 */ 
 int retN; 
 int * FC; 
 int * PC; 
 int * NC; 
 int decision; 
public: 
 friend class supplier; 
 retailer(); 
 /* 
 int getsxxp(); 
 int getoxxp(); 
 int getpxxp(); 
 int gettxxp(); 
 
 int getsxxf(); 
 int getoxxf(); 
 int getpxxf(); 
 int gettxxf(); 
 void setData(int, int, int, int,  int,int,int,int); 
 int decide(int,int,int,int,   int,int,int,int ); 
 */ 
 int *getDataFC(); 
 int *getDataPC(); 
 int *getDataNC(); 
 
 void setDataFC(int, int, int, int); 
 void setDataPC(int, int, int, int); 
 void setDataNC(int, int, int, int); 
  




 std::vector <supplier> supps; 






 friend class supplier; 
 friend class retailer; 
 
 system(); 
 std::vector <supplier> supps; 
 std::vector <retailer> rets; 
 
private: 
 int num; 
 
 
}; 
*/ 
 
